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DISORDER IN THE PEOPLE'S COURT: 1 RETHINKING
THE ROLE OF NON-LAWYER JUDGES IN LIMITED
JURISDICTION COURT CIVIL CASES
CATHY LESSER MANSFIELD*
If the will of the individual is subjected arbitrarily to the will of others because
the means of protection are too cumbrous and expensive to be available for one
of his means against an aggressive opponent who has the means or the
inclination to resist, there is an injury to society at large.2
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1. "The People's Cou1' is, of course, a reference to the television show in which former Los Angeles Judge
Joseph A. Wapner adjudicated small claims disputes in a half-hour show. By using this name in the title, I do not
mean to limit my comments to small claims cases, as is evident by the text of this article. Nevertheless, the
reference seems appropriate given the wide public knowledge of and reference to the television program. See
William M. O'Barr &John M. Conley, Lay Expectations ofthe Civil Justice System, 22 L & SOC'y REV. 137,152
n.l I (1988) ("We have been struck by the litigants' repeated references to "The People's Court." While we initially
joked about the "Wapner factor," we now suspect that the television program is a significant factor in many
litigants' decisions to go to small claims courts and an important influence on the way they prepare their cases.").
* Associate Professor of Law, Drake University Law School. I wish to thank Washburn University and
Drake University for research grants to work on this article. I also wish to thank my research assistants: Stephanie
Marrett, Jessica Rainey, Sandi Morris, Claire Cumbie-Drake, Darron Brawner, Katie Moreland and Marianne
Deagle. I especially wish to thank my primary research assistant Kelly Poff. I also wish to thank Ed Mansfield, Matt
Dord, Greg Sisk, Tom Baker and David Walker for reading and commenting on drafts of this article; the Drake
University library staff for their assistance; Community Legal Services for allowing me to review my old files while
preparing this article; and Maggie Vasquez for helping make those files available.
2. Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modem City, 26 HARv. L REv. 302. 315 (191213).
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MY PROBLEMS WITH NON-LAWYER JUDGES AND THE COURTS
OVER WHICH THEY PRESIDE

A. Case Number One
It was January 1992. I confidently marched into the Northeast Phoenix justice
court to file an Application and Affidavit for Default. The case I was working on
involved an attempt by the plaintiff (a collection agency) and its attorney to collect
a debt allegedly owed by my client. During the course of attempting to collect the
debt, the collector had engaged in conduct which violated the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act,3 so in response to the lawsuit, we filed a counterclaim alleging
violations of that Act. We waited for an answer to the counterclaim, but none was
forthcoming. Ultimately we decided to apply for a default judgment on our
counterclaim.

3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994 & Supp. U 1996).
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On that particular day, I was filing my Application and Affidavit for Default
pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Under this rule, my
application for default would become effective ten business days after filing, unless
the plaintiff pled or otherwise defended before the ten-day period expired.5 If the
plaintiff failed to do this, default would be entered automatically.6
In most cases, after an entry of default the moving party can get a default
judgment without a hearing simply by filing a motion for a default judgment with
the court.7 In some cases, however, the party entitled to the default judgment must
not only apply for the judgment but must also attend a hearing!
This was one of those cases where a hearing would be required. First, the
plaintiff had made an appearance in the case and was represented by counsel,
although, as described later, that counsel had thereafter failed to participate in the
lawsuit. Second, I had asked for an unspecified amount of attorney's fees.9
I approached the clerk working at the filing counter of the court and asked about
scheduling a hearing in which we could apply for a default judgment after default
had been entered. Once the hearing was set, I intended to file a Notice of
Application for Default Judgment, which would notify the Plaintiff of the time and
date of the hearing on my default judgment. Without missing a beat, the clerk
informed me that "We do not have default judgment hearings in this court,
regardless of the circumstances." I tried to explain Rule 55 of the Arizona Rules of
Civil Procedure to the clerk and reminded her that the Arizona justice courts are
required to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure.' ° Still, she insisted, "We don't do
4. See ARIZ.R. Civ. P. 55(a) (1992). Some states require that infornal notice be given to the attorney for
a party about to be defaulted for failure to pursue the suit if this is the local custom in the place where the suit is
being pursued. See, e.g., Central National Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 513 N.W.2d 750, 754-55
(Iowa 1994).
5. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. §§ 55(a)(2)&(3), 6(a) (1992).
6. See id. § 55(b).
7. See id.§ 55(b)(1).
8. See id. § 55(b)(2).
9. That I was not entitled to a default judgment on motion was clear from a close reading of rnle 55(b):
(b) Judgment by Default. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
1. By Motion.
(i) When the plaintiff's claim against a defendant isfora sum certain or for a sum which
can by computation be made certain, the Court upon motion of the plaintiff and upon affidavit
of the amount due shall enter judgment for that amount and costs against the defendant, if the
defendant has been defaultedforfailure to appear and is not an infant or incompetent person.
If the claim states a specific sum ofattorneys'fees which will be sought in the event judgment
is rendered by default, and if such award is allowed by law and is supported by the affidavit, the
judgment may include an award of reasonable attorneys' fees not to exceed the amount of the
demand therefor....
2. By Hearing. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment shall apply to the court
therefor.... If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action,
that party or, if appearing by representative, that party's representative, shall be served with
written notice of the application for judgment at least three days prior to the hearing on such
application.
See id. § 55(b) (emphasis added).
10. "The law governing procedure and practice in the superior court so far as applicable and when not
otherwise specially prescribed, shall govern procedure and practice in justice of the peace courts." ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 22-211 (1992). The justifications for requiring a hearing in a situation such as the one I faced include
acknowledging that the plaintiff has in fact appeared in the case, which is not the case with most defualts, and to
set an amount of attorneys' fees.
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it that way." Finally, she suggested that although she was sure I would not be
granted a default hearing, I could file a run-of-the-mill motion for hearing. She then
pulled out the court's pre-printed form.
I dutifully obliged, attaching a copy of the relevant pages from West's Arizona
Legal Forms and citing to Civil Procedure Rule 55. I figured that any hearing,
however obtained, would allow me to explain to the judge the need for a hearing on
my motion for a default judgment. I filled out the motion form, made some copies
for service on my opponent, and sought to file the original. As she handed it back
to me, the clerk informed me that the motion for hearing had to be served on my
opponent by certified mail. "Why?" I asked. "Service by certified mail is not
required by the Rules of Civil Procedure."'" The answer: "That is what we require."
Once again I reminded the clerk, to no avail, that the Arizona justice courts are
required to follow the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure."
So there I was. I could get a voidable default judgment from the court, which
would grant the judgment without a hearing despite rules to the contrary.
Alternatively, I could request a generic hearing, but would have to go to the expense
and effort of sending my hearing request via certified mail to my opposing counsel.
In the end, based on what the clerk told me, I could not be certain that the judge
would even address the default judgment issue at the hearing.
This was not the only problematic incident in this particular case. Plaintiff's
counsel proved quite difficult to deal with-refusing to respond to discovery
requests, filing an answer to our counterclaim and refusing to provide us with a
copy, and refusing to communicate with us. Plaintiff's counsel did not respond to
our First Set of Requests for Admission nor our Second Set of Interrogatories,
which had been served just short of nine months after the case had been filed. 3
Slightly more than two months after plaintiff's counsel had been served with these,
we sent her a letter indicating that the Requests for Admission were deemed
admitted and insisting that she answer the interrogatories within the next two weeks
or that we would file a motion to compel. In response to this letter, plaintiffs
counsel sent a letter notifying us that the action had been dismissed from the
inactive calendar more than a month earlier because of the plaintiffs failure to
prosecute. The letter further informed us that the plaintiff intended to let the suit
drop, and that the plaintiff did not intend to respond, and did not deem itself
obligated to respond, to our discovery requests.
The inactive calendar is a housekeeping provision of Arizona's Uniform Rules
of Practice. Uniform Rule V(e) provides that "[t]he clerk of the court or court
11. Itwas clear from the rules
that Ihad to send acopy of my application for entry of default to my opposing
counsel. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 55(a)(l)(ii) (1992) ("When a party claimed to be in default is known by the party
requesting the entry of default to be represented by an attorney, whether or not that attorney has formally appeared,
a copy of the application shall also be sent to the attorney for the party claimed to be in default."). Service of the
motion for default judgment was required by Rule 55(bX2). See id § 55(bX2) ("Ifthe party against whom judgment
by default is sought has appeared in the action, that party or, if appearing by representative, that party's
representative, shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three days prior to the
hearing on such application."). Service did not, however, have to be by certified mail since an attorney had made
an appearance on behalf of the plaintiff. See id §§ 5(a) and 5(c).
12. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 22-211 (1992).
13. At this point the case was being handled by another attorney since I had left my position with
Community Legal Services to take a law school faculty position.
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administrator shall place on the Inactive Calendar every case in which a Motion to
Set and Certificate of Readiness has not been filed within nine months after the
commencement thereof.... All cases remaining on the Inactive Calendar for two
months shall be dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution."' 4 This twomonth period can be extended by the court for g6od cause shown." The rules
further provide that "[t]he clerk of the court or court administrator, whoever is
designated by the presiding judge, shall promptly notify counsel in writing of the
placing of cases on the Inactive Calendar, and no further notice shall be required
prior to dismissal."' 6
When we discovered that the case had been dismissed without prejudice from the
inactive calendar-and with absolutely no notice to us-we went to the court to
find out what had happened. The clerk informed us that it was their practice to
notify only the plaintiff of deadlines for prosecuting the case.
Once again, this court had failed to follow the rules it was bound by state statute
to follow. First, the case was dismissed off the inactive calendar some time in
August 1992. This was done despite the fact that the first permissible date for even
placing the case on the inactive calendar was July 23, 1992 (nine months after the
plaintiff's complaint was filed) 7 and thus the first permissible date for dismissing
the case without prejudice off the inactive calendar would have been September 23,
1992 (two months later). 8 Second, the court had unilaterally decided that only
"plaintiffs" were entitled to any notice about the inactive calendar. Never mind that
the rule required notice to all counsel. Never mind that we were, in essence, a
plaintiff in regard to the counterclaim. Never mind that, due to plaintiff counsel's
difficult conduct we had good cause for extending the case on the inactive calendar.
The court's failure to follow the rules, and subsequent dismissal, essentially gave
the plaintiff the ability to walk away from the suit with no liability on the
counterclaim-a settlement option that the plaintiff had offered and we had
rejected.
In response to the clerk's oral notice to us that the case had been dismissed, we
asked how we could get the case reinstated-expecting the answer to be upon
motion, with an opportunity for the other side to respond. Rather, the clerk told us
we merely needed to request a trial date, which we did. In essence, the court
allowed us to reinstate a case in which there had been a final order dismissing the
case without prejudice by pretending that the case was still active and setting it for
trial. 19

14. ARIZ. SuPER. C. UNF. PRAC. R. § V(e).
15. See id.

16. Id. § V(f).
17. See id. § V(e).
18. See id § V(f).
19. After the case was reinstated, the court set a pre-trial conference. Just before the pre-trial conference,

the entire matter was settled by the plaintiff paying our client $150.00 and both parties agreeing to dismiss their
claims with prejudice.
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Case Number Two
It was March 13, 1992. My extern from Arizona State University Law School and
I were at the Central Phoenix justice court to attend a hearing in a case involving
a claim by the plaintiff law partnership that our client had committed $3,000 in
waste to the residential property she had leased from the plaintiff for three years.
Our client insisted that the property had been in despicable condition when she first
leased it, that she had actually been forced to make some repairs to the property
during the course of her tenancy, and that any damage claimed by the plaintiff had
existed at the time the lease was first entered into.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff had submitted four
affidavits: one each from the named partners in the law firm that owned and leased
the property, one from the maintenance man for the leased property, and one from
a secretary for the law firm. Each of the four affiants addressed the condition of the
property at the end of the lease, and the two partners testified through their
affidavits that the leased premises was not in the same condition when returned to
them as it had been at the beginning of the lease.
As counsel for defendant, we had responded to the motion, submitting as our
evidence the transcript of the plaintiff's deposition of our client, in which she had
consistently testified to the terrible condition of the property at the inception of the
lease, the improvements she had made during the tenancy, and the similarly bad
condition of the property at the end of the lease. We also submitted a list of defects
that the plaintiff had made at the beginning of the tenancy, and that had been
produced to the plaintiff in the course of discovery. We pointed out in our response
that the issue in the case was not whether the property was in bad condition when
the tenancy ended, but whether it was in worse condition when the tenancy ended
than it had been when the tenancy began, and that we had submitted evidence on
this point.
At the time, Arizona law provided that summary judgment should not be granted
if a jury presented with the case could reasonably find for either party.2' Summary
judgment was not to be granted where the judge ruling on the motion would be
required to "pass on the credibility of witnesses with differing versions of material
facts .... weigh the quality of documentary or other evidence ....[or] choose
among competing or conflicting inferences."'" Additionally, "[t]he evidence of the
non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor."2 Conversely, the case provided that a summary judgment motion "should
be granted if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little
probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people
could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or
defense."2 3

20.
21.
22.
23.

See Orme School v. Reeves, 802 P.2d 1000, 1007, 1009 (1990).
Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1008-1009.
Id. at 1008.
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The plaintiff filed a reply that argued that it should be granted summary judgment
because it had submitted four affidavits which had not been controverted by any
affidavits submitted by us.
Obviously the claim that we had submitted no controverting affidavits was
disingenuous, given that we had submitted the deposition transcript of the
defendant, which directly controverted the affidavits submitted by the plaintiff as
to all material relevant facts. Nonetheless, the argument that plaintiffs four
affidavits trumped defendant's deposition testimony apparently carried the day. On
March 18, 1992, the court issued a final order granting plaintiff its motion for
summary judgment. That this motion should not have been granted was later proved
by the superior court's reversal of the justice court's summary judgment.
Unfortunately for all of the parties involved it took until December 1992, and much
more work by each of the parties, before this issue was resolved correctly by the
superior court.
The court's improper grant of summary judgment was only the beginning, for
after summary judgment was granted a procedural and documentary fiasco ensued.
The summary judgment was announced in a minute entry issued by the court on
March 18, 1992. The judge had signed the minute entry, which made it a final
judgment, although the minute entry did order the plaintiff to prepare formal
judgment papers. We believed that the appeal time began running from the date of
this signed minute entry, based on Superior Court Rules of Appellate
Procedure-Civil Rules 8 and 9, which required that a notice of appeal be taken
within ten days after notice of entry of judgment.' Therefore, we filed a notice of
appeal on March 30, 1992 to preserve our appeal rights.
In the meantime, on Friday, March 27, 1992, plaintiff's attorney had filed a Form
of Judgment along with an Application for Award of Attorney's Fees and Statement
of Costs. On Monday, March 30, 1992, the court signed two versions of the form
of judgment submitted by the plaintiff. The first of these two judgments had the
judge's signature on the Form of Judgment submitted by the plaintiff, (including
attorney's fees in the amount of $4,607.50) with no changes by the judge. The
second of these two judgments had the judge's signature on the Form of Judgment
submitted by the plaintiff, but the judge had crossed out the amount of fees
indicated on the form by the plaintiff and replaced it with a handwritten attorneys'
fee award of $1,000. So now we had three final judgments.
There were many problems with the second and third judgments, in addition to
the conflicting amount of attorneys' fees. First, both were signed before we had a
chance to object to the amount of attorneys' fees requested or the form of judgment,
despite the fact that the rules provided us with an opportunity to object to the form
25
of judgment within five days of service of the proposed form of judgment. I had
never before handled a case where the court received a form of judgment on a
Friday and signed it on the following Monday without waiting for objection from
the other party.

24. See ARIZ. SUPER. Cr. R. APP. P.-CPIL 8(a) & 9.
25. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. § 58(d)(1).
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A second serious defect with the second and third judgments was that the court
never sent us a copy of them, although copies were mailed to the plaintiff. In fact,
it was quite clear from the judgments that this had been intentional, as the space
indicating to whom a copy had been sent had a check next to the plaintiff's
counsel's name and a line next to our name. We never received a copy of the second
of the three judgments, and we did not find out about the third of the three
judgments until April 8, 1992, when a clerk at the court called us to tell us that a
final judgment had been signed awarding plaintiff $1,000 in attorneys' fees.26 We
did not actually get a copy of the third of the three judgments until April 14, 1992,
more than two weeks after it was signed, and then only by accident. On that date,
an employee of a delivery service who did work for us somehow found a copy of
the judgment at the courthouse and brought it to us of his own accord.
In the meantime, on April 6, before we found out about the second and third
judgments signed by the court, we filed an objection to the plaintiff's application
for attorneys' fees, an objection to the plaintiff's form of judgment, and an alternate
form of judgment. In response to this motion, the court issued a stinging minute
entry, indicating that it had awarded fees of only $1,000, and "admonishing" us for
filing an objection to the form of order, in which we had asked that fees of no more
than $2,473.50 be awarded, before reading the court's order.2 7 Of course, when we
filed our objections we did not even know of the second and third final judgments.
It was at this time that I received the April 8 call from the court telling me that the
final order had been signed awarding $1,000 in attorneys' fees, asking if we thought
this was not enough (a rather ridiculous question since we were the party obligated
to pay the fees), and informing us that the judge would issue a fourth judgment on
the form that we had submitted.
By this point, neither party's counsel knew which was the final order and how
to calculate appeal deadlines. Both fed up with the justice court, we conferred and
decided to ask the court for a status conference to determine the status of the final
judgment for purposes of determining the appeal times and to ask for a new, truly
final judgment, vacating all previous judgments, so that the record was clear on
appeal. Plaintiff's attorney agreed to call the court to set up this status conference.
Much to the amazement of both counsel, rather than set a status conference where
counsel for both parties could be present, the judge took plaintiff's attorney's call
personally, thereby engaging in an ex parte communication with the plaintiffs
counsel. The judge told plaintiff's counsel that she would issue a fourth and final
judgment, which she did that day. Once again, this fourth judgment was mailed only
to plaintiff's counsel, not to defendant's counsel. At that point, we sent a letter to
the judge asking that all further minute entries be mailed to us as well.

26. The clerk expressed the rather absurd concern in this phone call that we might think that our opponent
should be awarded more than this as a reasonable amount for fees.
27. Specifically, the minute entry said, "With respect to the attorney fees, the defendant is admonished to
review the judgment issued by the court which reduced the award of attorney fees from $4,607.50 down to
$1,000.00. The court is at a loss as to understand why the defendant objects to the $1,000.00 the court awarded
when, in defendants pleading, an amount of $2,473.50 is suggested. Perhaps defendant's counselshould actually
read the judgment before submittingunnessary (sic) pleadings." (emphasis added). Minute Entry on file with
author.
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The Arizona Justice of the Peace Courts
What was going on in these cases? In the first case, had I merely stumbled on a
renegade court clerk, bent on making her own rules despite a statutory mandate that
she follow the state's rules? Would the judge of that court, if given the chance, have
instructed the clerk to follow the rules? More importantly, would the judge, if given
the opportunity, have known the rules or cared what they were? In the second case,
did I get caught in some sort of procedural quagmire unique to my case that caused
the confusion over the final order? Was it common for the court to keep only the
plaintiff apprised of events in the case? This was certainly consistent with what the
Northeast Phoenix justice court did in the first case. Was it possible that the judge
believed that four sworn affidavits were more probative than one deposition on a
matter of direct conflict between them?
Both of these cases were in an Arizona justice of the peace court. The justice of
the peace courts in Arizona are authorized by the Arizona Constitution' 3 and
governed by statute.29 The justices who preside in these courts are elected. " To
qualify as a justice of the peace, a candidate need only be 18 years of age, a resident
of the state, an elector of the county or precinct in which judicial duties are to be
exercised, and able to read and write English." Justices of the peace are not
32
required to be attorneys or have any legal training before their election, and very
few justices of the peace are actually lawyers.33 After they are elected, the Arizona
justices of the peace receive a mere 19 days of training before they are permitted to
take the bench. Based on an eight-hour day of classes, this justice of the peace
training is the equivalent of the class time attended by law students in roughly ten
weeks of their three-year law school career.' A good portion of the training is
devoted to issues relevant to criminal and traffic matters heard in Arizona justice
C.

35

courts.

28. See ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 32.
29. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-201 to 22-283 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997).
30. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-102,22-111.
31. See ARIZ.REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-402; Nicol v. Superior Court, Maricopa County, 473 P.2d 455 (Ariz.
1970). A recent study commissioned by the Arizona Supreme Court recommended increasing judicial requirements
by requiring all justice court judges to have a bachelor's degree, be at least thirty years old, be of good moral
character, have no prior felony convictions or warrants, and have passed a basic legal competency test. ARIZONA
SUPREME COURT, ADMINISRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITrEE
To STUDY IMPROVEMENTS IN THE LMnED JURISICTION CouRTs 26 (1995) [hereinafter REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS]. The report found: "The committee does not believe that all limited jurisdiction court judges
must be lawyers. However, it is important to note that cases filed in limited jurisdiction courts are becoming more
complex and do require competent, capable judicial officers." Id at 27.
32. See State v. Lynch, 489 P.2d 697, 698 (Ariz. 1971) (holding that since justices of the peace are qualified
for election so long as they meet the qualifications for eligibility for county office, they do not have to be attorneys);
Crouch v. Justice of the Peace Court, 440 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Ariz. App. 1968).
33. As of 1997 there were eighty-three justices of the peace in Arizona. Of those, fourteen were lawyers,
"an all time high." Interview with Rhonda McAdams, Arizona Supreme Court Administrator (July 22, 1998).
34. The Arizona statutes require the Supreme Court to establish a program of continuing education for
justices of the peace and magistrates. See ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-112. The contents of the program are
determined by the Supreme Court. See idThe agendas for the January 1997 New Judge Orientation and the March
1997 follow-up orientation conducted by the Arizona Supreme Court are attached to this article as Appendix 1.
35. See id
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Justice of the peace courts have been a part of the Arizona judicial landscape
since Arizona became a state in 1912.36 "Immediately upon statehood,. .. Arizona
was equipped with three operative courts of justice: the justice court, the superior
court, and the Supreme Court."37 The justice of the peace courts began with a $200
jurisdictional limit in civil cases.3"
In 1989, when I began my practice at Community Legal Services in Phoenix, the
Arizona justice of the peace courts had exclusive jurisdiction over matters where
the amount in controversy was less than $500, and concurrent jurisdiction with the
superior court (the Arizona court of general jurisdiction) over matters where the
amount in controversy was more than $500 but less than $2,500."9
I didn't have a whole lot of experience litigating in Arizona's justice of the peace
courts until after 1990. In 1990, the Arizona Legislature submitted a proposed
constitutional amendment to the Arizona electorate to raise the constitutionally
permissible jurisdictional limit of justice of the peace courts from $2,500 to
$10,000.' The legislature also revised section 22-201 of the Arizona statutes to give
the justice of the peace courts exclusive original jurisdiction over matters in which
the amount in controversy, exclusive of costs, interest and attorneys' fees, was
$5,000 or less, effective July 1, 199l."' This increase was conditioned upon voter
approval of a constitutional amendment increasing the justice of the peace
jurisdictional limit.42 The proposed constitutional amendment was presented to the
electorate as Proposition 102 in the November 6, 1990 election. It passed by a fiftythree percent vote, giving the justice courts constitutional authority to take
jurisdiction over cases where the amount in controversy did not exceed $10,000. 43
Thus, on July 1, 1991, pursuant to the statutory revision to section 22-201, 44 the
justice court was given exclusive original jurisdiction over matters in which the
amount in controversy was $5,000 or less.45 In 1993, however, the Arizona Supreme
Court scaled back the exclusive jurisdiction of the justice courts to cases where the
amount in controversy is less than $1,000 because the legislature had failed to
amend the constitutional provision giving the superior courts of Arizona original

36. See ARIZ. CIv. CODE 1913 §§ 2506, 2607, 2608, 2628. Reportedly, justices of the peace were
historically most active in the mountain and western states. See Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, The Decline of the
Justice of the Peace, 12 KAN. L. REV. 389, 390 (1964).
37. JAMES M. MURPHY, LAWS, COURTS, AND LAWYERS: THROUGH THE YEARS INARIZONA 93 (1970).
38. See id. at 94.
39. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 22-201(B) (1984); FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER ACFIONS-JUSTICE COURT

JURISDICTION, 1984, Ch. 113, § 1.
40. See Arizona S. Con. Res. 1003 (1990).
41.

See 1990 Ariz. Sess. Laws 223, § 2.

42. See id § 10(A) ("This act does not become effective unless the Constitution of Arizona is amended by
vote of the people at the next regular general election, or at a special election called for that purpose, to amend. the
constitutional jurisdictional limit of justices of the peace."). The statutory change was to become effective "from
and after June 30, 1991." See id § 10(B).
43. A total of 542,325 (53%) of the votes cast were in favor of the proposition, and 471,629 (46%) of the
votes cast were opposed to the proposition. See Ekction '90 ElectionResults Across Arizona, ARIZONA REPUBLIC,
Nov. 8, 1990, at A14. The proposition was proclaimed by the Governor on November 26, 1990 and the Arizona
Constitution was thereby amended. See ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 32, cl. C.
44. See 1990 Ariz. Sess. Laws 223, § 2.
45. An additional, minor amendment was made to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 22-201 in 1991 to harmonize
subsection F with the jurisdiction granted in subsection A over matters where the amount in controversy was
$5,000. See 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws 110, § 3, (effective October 1, 1991).
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jurisdiction of matters where the amount in controversy is $1,000 or more. 46 The
justice courts thus wound up with concurrent jurisdiction for matters where the
4
amount in controversy is between and including $1,000 and $5,000.'
After the 1991 change to the justice courts' jurisdiction, I spent a good deal of
my time litigating before these unpredictable, non-lawyer courts. When my clients
were sued in these courts, we were stuck there because there is no right of removal
to the superior court, even in cases where the justice and superior courts have
concurrent jurisdiction.48 If we filed a counterclaim valued at more than $5,000,
which forced the removal of the case to superior court, and if we were ultimately
awarded less than $5,000 (exclusive of costs and interest), the superior court could
49
deny us costs and could impose reasonable attorneys' fees on my client.
Furthermore, if I found it necessary to appeal a decision rendered by a justice of
the peace, I was faced with several problems. First, appellate review of a decision
rendered by the justice court is usually not de novo. A party appealing a justice
court decision can only obtain a de novo trial from the superior court "when the
transcript of the proceedings in the superior court's evaluation is insufficient or in
'
such a condition that the court cannot properly consider the appeal." By itself, this
provision suggests that virtually all reviews will be de novo, since the justice courts
5
are not courts of record under the Arizona Constitution. " However, the statute also
provides that "a trial de novo shall not be granted when a party who had the

46. See State ex rel Neely v. Brown, 864 P.2d 1038 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (holding that the legislature
could constitutionally give justice courts exclusive jurisdiction over matters where the amount in controversy was
less than $1,000, but could not constitutionally divest the superior court ofjurisdiction in matters where the amount
in controversy was between $1,000 and $5,000); see also ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 14, cl. 3 (giving the superior courts
of Arizona original jurisdiction in matters where the amount in controversy is $1,000 or more); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-123 (granting the superior court original jurisdiction as conferred by the Arizona Constitution).
47. See Neely, 864 P.2d at 1040 (stating that although the legislature could not constitutionally divest the
superior court of jurisdiction in matters where the amount in controversy was between $1,000 and $5,000, it could
grant concurrent original jurisdiction in such matters). This concurrent jurisdiction amount may now be raised to
$10,000 pursuant to Proposition 102. See ARIZ. CONST. art. 6. § 32, cl. C. In a recent study of the Arizona justice
courts a committee appointed by the Arizona Supreme Court recommended that the justice court's civil jurisdiction
limit be raised to the constitutional maximum of $10,000. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 31,
at 23.
48. There is no statutory right to remove a case filed in justice court to the superior court. Furthermore,
when courts have concurrent jurisdiction, jurisdiction over the case is vested in the first court to exercise
jurisdiction. See Wilson v. Garrett, 448 P.2d 857 (Ariz. 1969) (en banc); Allen v. Superior Court, 344 P.2d 163,
166 (Ariz. 1959) (holding that where a case was filed first in Cochise County, then by the other party in Maricopa
County, Cochise County had jurisdiction); Davies v. Russell 325 P.2d 402 (Ariz. 1958); In re Appeal in Maricopa
County Juvenile Action No. A-27789, 680 P.2d 163, 165 (Ariz. App. 1983) (holding that Maricopa County juvenile
court had no jurisdiction to determine adoption petition for two minors who had been adjudicated to be dependent
minor children by and made wards of the Yavapai County Juvenile Court); Agricultural Employment Relations Bd.
v. United Farm Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 548 P.2d 429, 433 (Ariz. App. 1976). For recognition of this problem
in New York, see Cohn A. Fieman & Carol A. Elewski, Do Non-Lawyer Justices Dispense Justice?, 69-JAN N.Y.
ST. B.J. 20 at n.3 (1997). Of course, in some cases there might be a right to remove the case to federal court. See
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
49. See ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-201(F). The superior court may also remand the case to justice court
if it decides that the amount involved in the counterclaim is really $5,000 or less. See id
50. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-261(C). This provision was adopted in 1990 along with the change in the
jurisdictional limit. See 1990 Ariz. Sess. Laws 223, § 5, effective July 1, 1991.
51. See ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 30, cI. A.
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opportunity to request that a transcript of the lower court proceedings be made and
failed to do so. [sic]"'52
So the situation in Arizona is this: justice courts are not courts of record, and so
they have no constitutional obligation to make a record of proceedings before
them.53 However, the litigant must request that the proceeding be recorded in order
to preserve his/her right of appeal.' While a litigant must be warned of his/her
obligation to ask for this record, the fact remains that this is the litigant's obligation,
55
not the court' S.
Furthermore, getting a copy of the transcript from the justice court is no easy
task. In the second case described in the opening of this article, I can remember the
court clerks acting as though they had never had such a request. The hearing had
been recorded on audio tape.' The rules for appealing from the justice court
decision required that a transcript of the proceedings be prepared and submitted to
the superior court.57 Although the Maricopa County Local Rules only required
preparation of a transcript if the tape was over one hour in length,5" I felt it was
necessary to prepare a written transcript of our proceeding because our case was
heard in the middle of the docket, and thus was in the middle of a tape that
contained the proceedings of the other cases heard the morning our case was heard.
However, the court clerks told me that they do not prepare such transcripts. The
rules were of no help to me since they do not say who is responsible for preparing
the transcript for the appeal. The rule says only that "a transcript. . . shall be
prepared., 59 Left to improvise, I ended up borrowing a copy of the tape of the
proceedings from the justice court and having my secretary transcribe it. After she
transcribed it, I had her sign a sworn affidavit that the transcript was an accurate
transcription of the tape. I had done the best that I could in order to perfect my
appeal, yet I knew that carrying the tape out of the justice court and having my own
secretary prepare the record for the appeal might lead to problems later on.'
Based on my experiences in the cases discussed above, as well as others not
recounted here, I began to suspect that the Arizona justice of the peace courts were,
for the most part, institutionally incapable of carrying out their assigned function
in the civil justice system of the State of Arizona. It seemed to me that Arizona had
retained its non-lawyer justice of the peace courts in some effort to hold on to
52. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. J 22-261(C). The 1995 study commissioned by the Arizona Supreme Court
recommends eliminating all
de novo appeals and requiring all matters to be audio-taped, video-taped, or recorded
by stenographic means. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 31, at 23.
53. See ARiZ.CONST. art. 6. § 30, cl.
A.
54. See ARM REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-26 1(C). Fieman and Elewski point out the irony that the very judges
who are most likely to make erors ae not required to record proceedings in their court. Fieman & Elewski, supra
note 48,at 20. This same criticism was leveled in 1927. See Chester H. Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in
the United States, 15 CAL. L REV. 118, 125 (1927).
55. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-261(C) ("At the beginning of each proceeding the judge shall advise
the parties that their right to appeal is dependent upon their requesting that a record be made of the justice court
proceedings. Any party to an action may request that the proceedings be recorded for appeal purposes.").
56. Audio recording is permitted by ARiz. SUPER. CT. R. APP. P.-CIVIL 11(e)(l).
57.
58.
59.

See ARI. SUPER. CT. R. APP. P.-CIVIL 1l(e)(2).
See MARICOPA COuNTY SUPER. CT. LOCAL PRAC. R. 9.4(a).
AR. SUPER. CT. R. ApP. P.--CV I l1(e)(2).

60. Another problem for appealing litigants is that they generally must post a bond for costs on appeal in
order to perfect an appeal from justice court to the Arizona Superior Courts. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1179.
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notions of community resolution of disputes involving little economic value. At the
same time, in an effort to afford the same procedural and substantive protections

and rights to all Arizona litigants, Arizona had charged these non-lawyers with the
task of following the laws of the state. In other words, these justices were assigned
the paradoxical task of acting like lawyers, without legal training or education,
6
while retaining their non-legal, member-of-the-community perspective.
The notion of having non-lawyers adjudicating civil matters governed by
substantive and procedural legal rules seemed anachronistic to me, particularly in
a city the size of Phoenix.62 I began to wonder if other attorneys in other states were
faced with similar problems in courts presided over by non-lawyers. Most
importantly, I began to wonder why a litigant, whose dispute involved a substantial
sum of money but simple legal issues, should be entitled to have the dispute
adjudicated by someone with legal training, while the average person embroiled in
a legally complex matter involving "only" hundreds or thousands of dollars was not
entitled to, and was statutorily prohibited from, the same level of legal expertise
from the judge.63

61. This schizophrenia in what we expect of limited jurisdiction judges has been recognized by several
prominent observers of non-lawyer courts. As early as 1927, Chester Smith observed:
Our statutes dealing with the justice of the peace system postulate a justice according to law,
that is, justice through the application of legal rules, standards and principles, which justice is
to be administered by a tribunal which for the most part is wholly unlearned in the law. This
proposition seems to be almost a contradiction.
Smith, supra note 54, at 127. Later, Doris Marie Provine, a political science professor, lawyer and former New
York town justice, commented more deeply on the conflict between legal training and non-legal, community
perspective:
Among those favorable to the continued participation of nonlawyers in adjudication, the call
nearly everywhere is for more education. The nonlawyer adjudicators themselves seem as
anxious as anyone for more training. Education for personnel ostensibly chosen because they
are not lawyers, however, raises difficult questions. The temptation is to try to make the
nonlawyers more like lawyers; indeed, criticism of lay capacities and performance is usually
couched in terms of their deviation from professional standards. Yet lay persons who internalize
professional criteria for judgment lose some of the very characteristics that rationalize their
presence in the system. Lay participants become more like experts in the institution. A legal
system, it seems clear, cannot simultaneously satisfy desires to represent citizen opinion on
tribunals and at the same time satisfy professional standards for performance.
DORIS MARIE PROVINE, JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NONLAWYER JUDGES AND THE POLIICS OF PROFESSIONAUSM 187-

88 (1986).
62. As I did my research for this article I was stunned to learn that justice by non-lawyer judges was thought
of as anachronistic as early as 1927. See Smith, supra note 54, at 118; see a/so PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE COURTS, TASK FORCE REPORT (1967) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE REPORT] (using the word "anachronism" to describe non-lawyer judges).
63. Exclusive jurisdiction amounts and inability to remove concurrent jurisdiction cases force litigants into
justice court whether they wish to be there or not. This fact distinguishes justice of the peace courts from other
voluntary, alternative dispute forums, such as mediation and neighborhood justice centers staffed by non-lawyers.
Many of these types of alternative dispute resolution forums enjoy the support of lawyers and bar associations, a
fact which has led some court observers to point out an apparent contradiction. See PROvINE, supra note 61, at 5355, 59. Yet, it is because these forums are not compulsory or binding that they garner the support of the legal
community, a fact also recognized by Professor Provine:
Nonlawyer mediators are tolerable while nonlawyer judges are not because, theoretically at least,
mediators derive their authority from the consent of the parties and they offer judgment in the
name of reconciliation. Where rights and social sanctions are at issue, on the other hand, the
argument for legal expertise has grown stronger with time.
Id. at 167.
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D.

Other Justice Court Stories
As I began to do research for this article I found other testimonies to the trials
and tribulations of litigating civil cases before non-lawyer judges. For example, in
their recent article in the New York State Bar Journal, Colin A. Fieman and Carol
A. Elewski recount the story of a non-lawyer judge who informed an attorney
appearing in her court that United States Supreme Court decisions did not apply in
her court." John M. Conley and William M. O'Barr, who personally observed
lawyer and lay judges in a 1987 empirical study, tell of a non-lawyer judge who
could not decide which party was telling the truth.6" The judge avoided making a
decision by ruling that the defendant had to pay the plaintiff exactly half of what
she requested, plus court costs.6
In another case reported by Conley and O'Barr, the same lay judge was required
to decide whether or not a man had gifted a bedroom set to his ex-fianc~e. 67 He
claimed he had never gifted the bedroom set to his ex-fianc6e, and was thus entitled
to have it returned to him.' The ex-fianc e claimed that the bedroom set had indeed
been gifted to her, and thus she was entitled to keep it.' Rather than decide whether
there had been a gift or not, the judge ruled that since the man had not fully paid for
the furniture he did not have the legal right to gift the bedroom set to someone else,
and thus ruled that the man was entitled to get the bedroom set back from his exfiancee.7 ° This ruling was made by the judge even though there was no evidence
introduced suggesting that the furniture was subject to a security interest, let alone

The other fact that recommends these types of dispute forums is that they are subject driven, and thus
participants can expect to have mediators who have some experience and expertise in discreet areas, such as
domestic or employment situations. Conversely, the jurisdiction of many non-lawyer limited jurisdiction courts is
based on amount in controversy, not subject matter, or, if subject matter is limited, it is limited to such large
subjects as "contracts."
64. Fieman & Elewski, supra note 48, at 20.
65. John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An Ethnography of Judicial
Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L REv. 467,486 (1988).
66. See id.In the case reported, a landlord had withheld $24.02 of a tenant's security deposit in order to
repair a refrigerator tray that the tenant allegedly damaged. See id. Only the landlord offered evidence regarding
damage to the tray. See id The judge awarded the tenant $12.01 (half of the retained security deposit) plus $19.00
for court costs. See id. Conley and O'Barr define this result as "extralegal." See id.
The issue of "splitting the difference" was addressed in Professor Provine's 1980 empirical study of New York
town, village and city judges. See PROVINE, supra note 61. The survey she circulated to the judges asked how
frequently the judges "split the difference" in small claims cases. See idat 86-87, 108-09, 227 n.65. Of the lawyer
judges surveyed, 34% said they didn't split the difference, 8% said they split the difference less than 10% of the
time, 24% said they split the difference 10% to 24% of the time, 29% said they split the difference 25% to 50%
of the time, and 4% said they split the difference over 50% of the time. See id at 227 n.65. Of the non-lawyer
judges surveyed, 30% said they didn't split the difference, 14% said they split the difference less than 10% of the
time, 22% said they split the difference 10% to 24% of the time, 30% said they split the difference 25% to 50%
of the time, and 4% said they split the difference over 50% of the time. See id. From a supportive perspective, this
question appears to get at the number of times the judges were able to abandon the constraints of an all-or-nothing
legal approach for a more conciliatory approach. See id. at 109. From a critical perspective, this question might
also address the number of times the judge could not decide who should win.
67. See Conley & O'Barr, supra note 65,at 487-88.
68. See id.
69. See id
70. See id.
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one that prohibited transfer of the bedroom furniture?' Conley & O'Barr noted that
in both cases this lay judge used language which "surrounds all of her actions with
an aura of legalism."72
Each of these stories simply heightened my concern that at the lowest economic
levels of justice parties often receive uninformed approximations of justice cloaked
in legal authority and formalism. Why aren't justice court litigants entitled to a
judge who is able to comprehend and apply the substantive and procedural rules that
apply in their cases? Why wasn't the landlord in the first case entitled to a judge
who would be able to assess the credibility of the witnesses and make a decision?
Why wasn't the woman with possession of the bedroom set entitled to adjudication
by a judge who could make a decision based on the evidence before her and the law
regarding secured goods? Why wasn't I able to get the default hearing to which my
client, and our opponent, were entitled? How could any judge view the burden of
proof as a quantitative rather than a qualitative measure? How could a court
unilaterally decide to communicate items to the plaintiff and not to the defendant?
E. The Goal of this Article
My initial goal in writing this article was empiric and reformative. But as I
worked on the article, I realized that I could not hope to answer for each of the 50
states whether non-lawyer judges should be permitted to adjudicate civil cases.
Keeping in mind the observation that court reform suggestions that set forth
standards to be considered rather than ends to be reached are more useful to a
greater number of court systems," and the reality that the non-lawyer judge has
been a resilient figure in American justice,7 4 my reformed goal is to inspire a reinspection of the civil jurisdiction of non-lawyer courts in as many states as
possible, and to set forth considerations that should play a role in that reexamination.'S
In an effort to provide some essential tools I believe are needed for a reinspection of the role non-lawyer judges should play in civil cases, in Part II of this
article, I address the historical roots of the non-lawyer justice court system in the
United States and efforts to reform that system. In Part HI, I discuss notions that
have perpetuated the use of non-lawyer judges in civil cases, whether these notions
are reality-based, whether a law degree should be required given the realities of
civil litigation in limited jurisdiction courts, and the effects of mis-matching judicial
tasks with judicial qualifications. Finally, in appendices 2 and 3, I present a state71. See id.
72. Id. at 489.
73. See Carl Baar, Trial CourtUnification in Practice,76 JUDICATURE 179, 184 (1993) ("By prescribing

a single model of trial court organization, rather than articulating a set of criteria whereby a variety of differently
designed trial courts can be assessed, the ABA standards [Relating to Court Organization (Chicago, 1990)] are
more likely to curb creative efforts to improve the courts than to spur implementation of needed reforms.").
74. Ithas been further suggested that due to political considerations, and the disqualification of incumbents,
"elimination of the justices of the peace and their equivalents is often the last difficult step to court unification."
Justin Green et al., Iowa's Magistrate System: The Aftermath of Reform, 58 JUDICATURE 380, 381 (1975).
75. For an example of the type of scrutiny that non-lawyer courts in each state demand, see John G. Baker,
The History of the Indiana Trial Court System and Attempts at Renovation, 30 IND. L REV. 233 (1997), which
addressed court unification problems in Indiana, and Cynthia Ford, Civil Practice in Montana's "People's
Courts": The Proposed Montana Justice and City Court Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 MONT. L REV. 197 (1997).
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by-state survey of statutes relating to civil jurisdiction and judicial qualifications in
non-lawyer courts.76
It is my sincere hope that this article will lead to informed debate and reexamination of the civil jurisdiction of non-lawyer courts by the legislators and
electorates who have created and perpetuated these courts, by state bar associations
and state courts that have monitored and supervised these courts, and by the
consumers and citizens who use these courts.
II. A HISTORY OF NON-LAWYER JUSTICES IN CIVIL MATTERS
AND EFFORTS AT REFORM"
A. A History of Non-Lawyer Justices in Civil Matters
Non-lawyer justices of the peace have been a part of the American legal
landscape since its beginning. 78 When the first settlers came to America, there were
very few lawyers and, consequently, very few lawyer judges. 79 There likely were
many reasons for not using lawyer judges. First, it has been observed that when
American law was in its infancy, the law was not complex, and thus could be
applied by a lay person.' Additionally, logistical difficulties, such as the state of
communication and transportation, inhibited adjudication by non-local judges.8
Reportedly, using non-lawyer judges was also more consistent with democratic
ideals, such as the public's belief that the law should be understandable, and thus
applicable, by lay persons.8 2 There was also the belief, still held by some, that the
lay judge was closer to the community than a lawyer judge, and therefore "more
likely to reflect the community's sense of justice."83 Finally, like the rest of our
legal system, the practice of using non-lawyer judges was imported from England,
although English justices of the peace did not have jurisdiction over civil matters.8 4
Until the Revolutionary War, most colonial courts were officiated by non-lawyer
judges." Sometime thereafter, some states began requiring their judges to be trained

76. This article does not address criminal or probate matters that may be heard before non-lawyer judges.
77. For an extensive history of non-lawyer justices, see THE POLTICs OF INFORMAt JUsTIcE (Richard L
Abel ed., 1982).
78. See Allan Ashman & David L Lee, Non-Lawyer Judges: The Long Road North, 53 CHI.-KENT L REV.
565 (1977); James A. Gazell, A NationalPerspective on Justices of the Peace and Their Future: Time for an
Epitaph?,46 MISS. .J.795,797 (1975) (dating the first use of the justice of the peace to 1607); Smith, supra note
54. For a general history ofjustices of the peace and lay judges, see JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES
(1960) and JOHN R. WUNDER, INFERIOR COURTS, SUPERIOR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
ON THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER, 1853-1859 (1979).
79. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at 1;Ashman & Lee, supra note 78, at 567.
80. See Ashman & Lee, supra note 78, at 567.
81. See id.; Smith, supra note 54, at 118.
82. See Jeffrey R. Pankratz, NeutralPrinciplesand the Right to NeutralAccess to the Courts, 67 IND. LJ.
1091, 1102-03 (1992) ("Thus, rather than replicate the clumsy in forma pauperis statute to ensure that all citizens
could retain counsel, many persons pushed for legal systems that could be understood and thus used by all without
the retention of counsel.").
83. Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstonesof the JudicialProcess, 2-SPRING KAN. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 5,19 (1993).
See also PROVINE, supra note 61, at 11-19.
84. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at 26. For a concise history of justice of the peace courts in England, see
Gazell, supra note 78, at 796-97; see also Ashman & Lee, supra note 78, at 566-67.
85. See Pound, supra note 2, at 303.
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in the law. 8 6 Other states excluded lawyers from judicial service, a move largely
attributed to popular and religious antagonism toward the legal profession. 7
Over time, as the federal and state governments evolved and grew, and as
commerce increased, the professional practice of law became more common. 8
Legal principles and rules of law developed, requiring a far greater degree of
knowledge for their application. 9
Despite the earlier trend in favor of a non-lawyer bench, by the mid- 1800s lawyer
judges were the norm except in geographic areas where there were still few
lawyers.' This was due, in part, to the increasing complexity of the law9 ' and to
better training and organization of lawyers and judges.'
As with all other levels of the judiciary, the first limited jurisdiction courts in the
United States were also staffed largely by non-lawyer judges.9 3 As the country
moved toward a judiciary comprised of lawyers in all other levels, however, courts
of limited jurisdiction continued to permit non-lawyers to serve as judges.' By far,
the most common title for a non-lawyer judge was the justice of the peace.95
Originally, the office of justice of the peace "was a part-time, elective office,"
always filled by "a local resident and often a leader in the community." These
justices did not employ advisors who were learned in the law, a practice then
common in England, but rather, relied on their own capabilities to rule on matters
that came before them.9 Originally, justices of the peace had administrative as well
as judicial responsibilities, although the administrative responsibilities were
eventually eliminated.98
Justices of the peace were paid with fees collected from litigants, but otherwise
received no salary. 9 This fee model, which led to competition for cases among the
justices of the peace, and sometimes meant that justices might not collect their fees
if they decided for one party over the other party, led to the first significant reform
in the lower courts-the elimination of non-lawyer judges in the Chicago municipal
courts. I00

86. See PROVNE,supranote 61, at 10-11, 14.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1,5.
89. One author noted that before this development, "[f]ew legal principles or rules had been worked out and
there was little legislation either to guide or hamper the magistrate. Hence, he was probably as capable as anyone
to administer justice according to his own judgment and common sense." Smith, supranote 54, at 118.
90. See PROVNE, supranote 61, at 1,16-17.
91. See id. at 17.
92. See id. at 30.
93. Seeid atlO-11.
94. Seeid. atxii, 11, 18.
95. Professor Provine describes justices of the peace as the forefathers of modem nonlawyer judges. See
PROVINE, supra note 61, at xii.
96. PROVINE, supra note 61, at xii.
97. See id. at 27-28.
98. See id. at 30.
99. See id. at xii, 27; Smith, supranote 54, at 120. This aspect of the system has received a tremendous
amount of criticism. See, e.g., Vanlandingham, supranote 36, at 392-95.
100. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at 30; Gazell, supra note 78, at 799; Robert S. Keebler, OurJustice of the
Peace Courts-A Problem in Justice,9 TENN. L REV. 1, 4 (1930).
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By the 1930s, non-lawyer judges had been eliminated from the municipal courts
in most large eastern cities but remained in many other courts in the country.' 0 ' In
these areas, the courts moved from a model of non-lawyer justice for all to one of
non-lawyer justice for only those civil litigants whose controversies involved
"small" sums of money."°
B. A History of Efforts to Reform Non-Lawyer Courts
The call for reform in non-lawyer courts in the United States is not a new one.
In 1906, Simeon Baldwin published a book in which he claimed that "[t]he weakest
point in this system of judicial organization is the vesting of jurisdiction of small
civil causes in justices of the peace" who need not be lawyers.0 3 That same year,
Roscoe Pound raised the issue of non-lawyer judges in a speech to the American
Bar Association about the maladies of the American legal system.' Dean Pound
raised the issue again in a 1912-13 article in the Harvard Law Review. 5
In 1913, the American Judicature Society, an organization dedicated to court
reform, was founded.' 6 Around this time, some metropolitan areas began the
process of reforming or even eliminating justice of the peace courts. 7 Academics
began calling for the elimination of non-lawyer judgeships, arguing that only one
trained in the law had the necessary qualifications to adjudicate matters meant to
be determined under the law.'08
In 1927, Chester H. Smith wrote the first major academic article to call for the
abolition of the office of justice of the peace, arguing that
today, with paved roads, automobiles and instant communication, all of which
obtain, with but few exceptions, in the remotest rural communities, it is safe to
say that the conditions which forced the creation and spread of the justice of the
peace system in the United States have long since ceased to exist."
Smith concluded "[t]here is no basis in logic or reason for requiring a different
standard of qualifications for the officer deciding disputes between two citizens

101. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at 33.
102. See id.
103.

See SIMEON BALDWIN, THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 129 (1906).

104. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice (1906)
in 46 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 55, 58 (1962) ("None the less, the notion that anyone is competent to adjudicate
the intricate controversies of a modem community contributes to the unsatisfactory administration ofjustice in
many parts of the United States.").
105. See Pound, supra note 2,at 327 ("Another difficulty is that we assume a petty judge is good enough
for petty causes. In these cases we must have free scope for the good sense of the judge, tempered by knowledge
of the law... or we must deny justice.").
106. For a brief history of the American Judicature Society, see Herbert Harley, Concerning the American
JudicatureSociety, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 9 (1936). Originally, Harley did not think that using laymen as
judges would pose a problem, so long as the court system was unified. See Herbert Harley, An Efficient County
Court System, 73 ANNUALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 189, 190 (1917);
see also CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, DelegalizationReform Movements: A HistoricalAnalysis, THE POLITICs OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE 35, 45-47 (Richard L Abel ed., 1982).
107. See Gazell, supra note 78, at 799; Keebler, supra note 100, at 4.
108. See Austin W. Scott, Small Claims and PoorLitigants,9 A.B.A. J. 457 (1923); Reginald Heber Smith,
Denialof Justice, 3 JUDICATURE 12 (1919); Milton Strassburger, A Pleafor the Reform of the InferiorCourt, 22
CASE AND COMMENT 20 (1915-16).
109. Smith, supranote 54, at 118. See also Gazell, supra note 78,at 799.
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having large sums in controversy and the officer determining disputes between two
citizens having but a few dollars in controversy.""' Other articles with similar
themes followed."'
In 1931, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement
(popularly named the Wickersham Commission, after its chairman) recommended
the improvement or elimination of non-lawyer judges in limited jurisdiction courts,
finding that the non-lawyer justice had become outdated." 2 In 1938, the ABA made
a series of recommendations, called the Vanderbilt-Parker Standards, that were
based on the assumption that all judges at all court levels should be lawyers." 3 This
theme of replacing or improving antiquated justice of the peace courts was raised
sporadically after this." 4
By the 1940s, some states had moved to a model that required all lower court
judges to be trained in the law." 5 Beginning in the early 1960s, organized groups
such as the American Bar Association and the American Judicature Society
"explicitly or implicitly sought the abolition of justices of the peace and their
kindred offices."' " 6 Additionally, there were renewed calls by academicians that
only lawyers should be allowed to serve as lower court judges." 7 By the mid-1960s,
those states that allowed non-lawyers to serve as judges had restricted them to the
very lowest courts and placed them "under the supervision of central administrative
authorities.""' Nevertheless, many states still retained courts where non-lawyer
judges could serve.
In 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed a task force comprised of
prominent law professors, justice department officials, and members of the bar to
study and make suggestions to improve the United States criminal court systems." 9
The task force issued a report making the point, in terms strikingly similar to
Chester Smith's 1927 article, that "conditions which gave rise to the development
of justice courts largely disappeared with the advent of modem means of travel and
almost instantaneous communication. As a result, the lay-manned, fee-paid court

110. Smith, supra note 54, at 120.
111. See, e.g., A.B. Butts, Justice of the Peace-Recent Tendencies, 1 MISS. Li. 195 (1928); Keebler, supra

note 100; T.L Howard, The Justice of the Peace System in Tennessee, 13 TENN. L REV. 19 (1934).
112. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at 41; Gazell, supra note 78, at 800.
113. See ARTHURT. VANDERBLT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1949) (discussed

in Baker, supra note 75, at 235-36); PRovINE, supra note 61, at 40.
114. See, e.g., Gazell, supra note 78, at 800; Jack Harrison Pollack, Cow Pasture Justice, 28 MICH. STATE
B. J. 12, 12-16 (1949); Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Pecuniary Interest of Justices of the Peace in Kentucky; The
Aftermath of Tumey v. Ohio, 45 KY. LJ. 607, 607-25 (1957).
115. See Linda J. Silberman, Non-Attorney Justice: A Survey and Proposed Model, 17 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
505 (1980). Professors Lamber and Luskin identify the 1930s and 1940s as the first time when prescriptions for
judicial change were adopted. Julia Lamber & Mary Lee Luskin, Court Reforn A View from the Bottom, 75
JUDICATURE 295 (1992).

116. Gazell, supra note 78, at 800.
117. See, e.g., David R. Mason & William F. Crowley, Montana's Judicial System-A Blueprint for
Modernization, 29 MONT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1967) (presenting a plan for the modernization of Montana's justice
system, including the abolition of inferior courts); Vanlandingham, supra note 36, at 396, 403 ("The most apparent
weakness of minor court reform in some states has been the failure to require judges of minor courts to be
lawyers.").
118. See Silberman,supra note 115, at505.
119. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at 44.
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is an anachronism."'' The report concluded that limited jurisdiction courts should
have a "wide territorial basis" and be "manned by salaried, law-trained judges." ''
In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals once again concluded that justice of the peace courts should be abolished,
stating that "[a] first step for those States without formal plans for court
reorganization and unification would be to abolish the justice of the peace and
municipal courts in metropolitan areas and to replace them with unified county or
multi-county systems ... staffed by full-time judges with law degrees who are
members of the bar."" 2
Reportedly, "by the mid-1970s, most states had reformed [justice] courts
significantly, reducing excess judges, instituting training programs and qualifying
exams, usually with federal funding from the now defunct Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA), eliminating the worst aspects of the fee system,
and sometimes providing salaries for justices traditionally supported by fees.' ' 3
Nevertheless, the call to eliminate all remaining non-lawyer judgeships continued."n
One of these articles even predicted the demise of the justice of the peace by the end
of the twentieth century."n
In the late 1970s, the National Center for State Courts, led by Professor Linda J.
Silberman, conducted the first major modem study of non-lawyer justice.'2 6 The
study, the results of which were published in a report and a Harvard Journal on
Legislation article, concluded that "in the best of all possible worlds, an attorney
judge would be preferred," even in minor matters."n Recognizing that this might not
be feasible in all areas, the study went on to say that if it was not possible to replace
non-lawyer judges with lawyer judges in all cases, "it is recommended that lay
courts retain civil jurisdiction only in 'simple' civil actions where the amount in
controversy does not exceed $2,000. ' Cases identified as too complex for nonlawyer judges included "attachments and garnishments, real property actions,
slander or libel, and malicious prosecution---and those actions where serious social

120. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 62, at 34. The report particularly criticized the fee-based system for
compensating justices of the peace. See id at 34-35. Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that judicial fees dictated
by case outcome are unconstitutional in criminal cases. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
121. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 62, at 35. Perhaps in recognition that this might not be an attainable
goal in some states, the final conclusion of the report was that "all persons exercising judicial functions should
either be lawyers or be required to complete rigorous judicial training prior to assuming office." Id at 36. However,
the report continued, "[w]hile such courses may prove beneficial, to ensure a better quality of training and higher
interest in the work performed, it is far preferable that judicial officers be lawyers." Id
122. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSIlE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS 162 (1973)
(quoted in Gazell, supra note 78, at 795).
123. PROVINE, supra note 61, at 55; accordVanlandingham, supra note 36, at 389.
124. See, e.g., Ashman & Lee, supra note 78; Gazell, supra note 78, at 797; Green et al., supra note 74; Paul
Nejelski, Query, Do Minor Disputes Deserve Second-Class Justice?, 61 JUDICATURE 102 (1977).
125. See Gazell, supra note 78, at 813. Earlier articles had made similar, if less specific, predictions. See
Vanlandingham, supra note 36, at 403. But see Ashman & Lee, supra note 78, at 568 ("IN]on-lawyer judges are
not facing imminent extinction. They have been remarkably resilient through the centuries of dramatic growth and
change.").
126. INSTITUTEOFJUDICIALADMINISTRATION, INC., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, NON-ATrORNEY
JuSncE IN THE UNrrED STATES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (1979) [hereinafter NoN-ATrORNEY JUSTICE]; Silberman,

supra note 115.
127. See NON-ATrORNEY JUSTICE, supra note 126, at 101.
128. Id. at 101;Silbernan, supranote 115, at 540-41.
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consequences are likely to ensue, such as cases involving novel theories of
liability." 129 Alternatively, Silberman identified "simple contract and tort cases" as
types of cases that lay judges could be adequately trained to handle."'
The intensified interest in non-lawyer judges in the 1970s coincided with, and
was undoubtedly partly the result of, the appeal of North v. Russell, 3 ' a limited
jurisdiction criminal case to the United States Supreme Court. In North, the
Kentucky non-lawyer judge had jailed Lonnie North for a first offense of driving
while intoxicated (DWI). 32 There was no statutory authority for a jail sentence on
a first DWI offense. 133 The judge also denied North's request for a jury trial and
revoked his drivers license. 34 During the litigation over the non-lawyer judge's
conduct, discovery was taken and amicus briefs filed showing that many lay judges
came to their positions completely unprepared for their judicial role. 35 Non-lawyer
judges appeared to be unable to locate and understand statutes, did not understand
what statutes were, and were clueless as to many other basic judicial
responsibilities."3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that Kentucky's lay judge
authority did not raise constitutional concerns, since North had the right to trial de
novo before a lawyer judge.' After this case garnered attention, the same issue was
litigated in many state courts, and the policy was revisited by several state
legislatures. 13
In 1980, Doris Marie Provine, a political scientist, lawyer, and former New York
town justice,'39 undertook the second major study of the differences between nonlawyer and lawyer justices. " As part of the study she examined town and village
courts in the State of New York, many of which were at the time and are still staffed
by non-lawyer judges.' 4' In addition to disseminating a questionnaire, Professor
Provine visited 26 judges (13 lawyers and 13 non-lawyers) and observed them

129. Silberman, supra note 115, at 541.

130. See id. at 545. 1 do not agree with this conclusion. See infra notes 179-207 and accompanying text.
131. 427 U.S. 328 (1976); see also Gordon v. Justice Court, 525 P.2d 72 (Cal. 1974), cert. den. 420 U.S.
938 (1975). This case went to the Supreme Court just after the California Supreme Court had held that defendants,

charged with a criminal offense for which they could be jailed, were constitutionally denied the effective assistance
of counsel if they were forced to appear before a non-lawyer judge.
132. See North, 427 U.S. at 329-30.
133. See id. at 329.
at 330.
134. See id.
135. See Allan Ashman & Pat Chapin, Is the Bell Tollingfor Nonlawyer Judges? 59 JUDICATURE 417, 41718(1976).
136. See id at 418 (providing an excerpt from the court file). In North, the justice of the peace denied North
a jury trial, although he was "clearly entitled to a jury trial upon request" under Kentucky law. 427 U.S. at 343

(Stewart, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 339.
138. See John Paul Ryan & James H. Guttuman, lawyer Versus Nonlawyer Town Justices: An Empirical
Footnote to North v. Russell, 60 JUDICATURE 272 n.l (1977). The case also led to critical law review articles. See,
e.g., Ashman & Lee, supra note 78.
139. Professor Provine was a town justice from 1978 until 1982 in Virgil, New York. See PROVINE, supra
note 61, at 87.
140. See id. at 86. Professor Provine sent a written questionnaire to "1,647 non-lawyers and 575 lawyers, 137
of whom were city judges." ld. Seventy-four percent of the non-lawyers and fifty-five percent of the lawyers
responded. See id

141. In 1980, when Professor Provine conducted her study, New York had over 1,600 non-lawyer judges.
See id
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conducting the business of their courts. 42 She then wrote a book, published in 1986,
largely supportive of the use of non-lawyer judges.4 At that time, approximately
13,000 judgeships in 43 states were held by individuals with no legal education.'"
Professor Provine's conclusion that non-lawyer judges can be as competent as
lawyer judges in courts of limited jurisdiction was a notable exception to the
position held by most other authors on the subject. However, her conclusion has
support in two articles by Professors Julia Lamber and Mary Lee
found recent
45
Luskin.

In 1990, the American Bar Association re-iterated its position that all judges
should be lawyers, concluding in a report that there should be a "single-level trial
court with a single class of judges."'" Perhaps the most recent proposal which
would impact the jurisdiction of non-lawyer judges is model legislation drafted by
HALT-An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform, to raise the jurisdictional
limits of small claims courts in each of the fifty states to $20,000. 14 The proposal
itself does not address whether the judges in these courts should be lawyers.
While commentators might disagree as to the competence of non-lawyers to
adjudicate, everyone can agree that there is very little information available
regarding these courts and, particularly, their civil caseload. 48 The only annual
information about these courts is a report by the National Center for State Courts
and the Conference of State Court Administrators.' 49 This report merely provides
statistical information about these courts. It does not provide the sort of casespecific observation and information that has led me to conclude that non-lawyers
should be divested of civil jurisdiction.
Even the most extensive research regarding non-lawyer judges does not take into
account or address what others believe to be important information necessary to a
full analysis of the capabilities of lay judges. t ' Indeed, some commentators have
suggested that most opinions held about non-lawyer judges are based on something
other than information regarding the actual work done by non-lawyer judges.'

142. See id. at 86-87.
143. See PROVD4E, supra note 61.
144. See id.
145. See Julia Lamber & Mary Lee Luskin, City and Town Courts: Mapping Their Dimensions, 67 IND. LJ.
59 (1991); Lamber & Luskin, supra note 115.
146. Baar, supra note 73, at 179 (referring to the American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Court
Organization (1990)).
147. See Jill Schachner Chanen, Pumping up Small Claims, Reformers Seek $20K Court Limits-With No
Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1998, at 18. Obviously, this would impact the non-lawyer judge issue only in those states
that allow non-lawyers to preside over small claims.
148. In 1991 civil cases made up only 12% of the cases heard nationally in limited jurisdiction courts. See
1991 STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1991). Therefore, it is not surprising that the
information available about limited jurisdiction courts, and any studies of these courts has focused primarily on
the criminal and traffic jurisdiction of these courts.
149. Seeid. atxiv.
150. See, e.g., PROVINE, supranote 61, at 105 (criticizing the conclusions reached in the Silberman study
as not being supported by the observations made during the course of that study).
151. See, e.g., Lamber & Luskin, supra note 115, at 298 ("there is no justification-empirical or
theoretical-for this proposal [that all judges should be lawyers]; it simply assumes that a lawyer judge would be
better."); see also David A. Harris, Justice Rationed in the Pursuitof Efficiency: De Novo Trials in the Criminal
Courts, 24 CONN. L REv. 381, 398 (1992)("ln Colten [Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972)], the Supreme
Court stated that sentences in lower courts usually are not severe. The court, however, offered no support for this
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Despite this lack of study, and the continued dominance of the position that the
limited, 15 2
civil jurisdiction of non-lawyer judges should be eliminated or severely
non-lawyer courts have proved rather resilient. Currently 29 of the 50 states allow
another. 1 3
non-lawyer judges to adjudicate civil matters in one form or
Furthermore, the civil jurisdictional limits in many state limited-jurisdiction courts
54
have been increasing.
It is difficult to determine the impetus for the jurisdictional increases some nonlawyer courts have been granted recently. There is evidence that some jurisdictional
increases for non-lawyer justice courts were motivated by a desire to reduce the
55
number of cases on the dockets of courts of record. Changes also may have been
spurred by a belief that it costs less money to operate non-lawyer, limited
courts. 56
jurisdiction courts than to hear the same cases in general jurisdiction
5
Certainly, inflation has played some role.1 1 Whatever the reasons for these
jurisdictional increases, they do not appear to have been articulated at the time they
were implemented. My concern is that this silence reflects a failure to fully analyze
these courts and to determine whether an increase in jurisdictional limit was more
beneficial than not. The rest of this article suggests the considerations necessary to
such a full analysis.

proposition.") (citations omitted). Harris also criticizes the court's assumption in that case that judges on de novo
appeal would be more likely to be sympathetic rather than critical of a criminal appellant because of the court's
paramount concern for the quality of adjudication below, which would be more important to the court than
considerations of the court's time taken by a de novo appeal. See id at 392.
152. See, e.g., Feman & Elewski, supra note 48. Contra, Lamber & Luskin, supra note 145; Lamber &
Luskin, supra note 115.
153. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia,
Wyoming. See Appendix 3, infra.
154. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-104 (1987 & Supp. 1996) (raising the jurisdictional limit in 1990
from $5,000 to $10,000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 9301, 9303, 9304 (1974 & Supp. 1996) (raising the
jurisdictional limit in 1995 from $5,000 to $15,000); OKiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 123 (West 1998) (raising the
jurisdictional limit for special judges from $400 to $1,000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3-10 (Law Co-op. 1978 & Supp.
1997) (raising the jurisdictional limit in 1994 from $2,500 to $5,000); S.D. CODWiED LAws § 16-12A-19 (Michie
1995 & Supp. 1998) (raising the jurisdictional limit in 1997 from $4,000 to $8,000 in uncontested civil actions).
155. See Ryan Konig, Justice Courts Could Face 20% Hike in Cases in July Because of Changes, ARIZONA
REPuBLIC, Jan. 4, 1991, at 5N10.
156. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at xiv, 44, 62. Whether this assumption is true or not is unclear. While it
is true that lawyer judges might expect a higher salary and more assistance, such as a secretary or bailiff, there is
some evidence to suggest that lawyers can handle matte at a faster pace than non-lawyers. For example, Professor
Provine compared the salaries and case loads of New York limited-jurisdiction judges and found that while the
lawyers were paid more on an annualized basis, they cost less per case than non-lawyer judges because they
disposed of five times as many cases as the non-lawyer judges. See id. at 138-39. Whether speed in disposition is
a good thing depends to some extent on what the numbers mean. On one hand, quicker disposition might indicate
a greater efficiency and ability to act on the part of lawyer judges. On the other hand, it might reflect an
unwillingness by lawyer judges to receive information which would be deemed legally insignificant in other court
settings. The ability to air one's fuller story is believed by some to be a great benefit to the court clientele. See, e.g.,
Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:LearningLessons of ClientNarrative, 100 YALE LJ.
2107 (1991). But see, Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Deconstructing Reconstructive Poverty Law: Practice-Based
Critique of the Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of PracticeMovement, 61 BROOK. L REV. 889 (1995).
157. See Thomas E. Baker, The History and Tradition of the Amount in Controversy Requirement: A
Proposalto "Up the Ante" in DiversityJurisdiction,102 F.R.D. 299, 314-16 (1984).
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THE ROLE OF THE NON-LAWYER JUDGE IN CIVIL JUSTICE INTO
THE 21ST CENTURY: SOME CONSIDERATIONS

A.

Notions that Underlie Perpetuationof the Civil Jurisdictionof Non-Lawyer
Judges
One of the images that underlies much of the non-lawyer judge discourse is that
of the wise and experienced member of the community, unrestrained by the
formality of court rules, and informed by his knowledge of local custom, and
perhaps even the knowledge of individuals before him. This non-lawyer judge is
therefore able to craft inventive, practical, community-based solutions to the daily,
simple problems of the court clientele.' 58 Thus, lay courts are seen as community
dispute resolution centers where "little" disputes between parties can be worked out
in an informal setting.
Historically, this may have been true. As originally conceived and put into
operation, non-lawyer justice courts were forums where litigants with minor claims
could come to have their disputes resolved in an informal setting by a trusted
community member.'5 9 Reportedly, as a consequence of using non-lawyer judges,
"[t]he early American trial often resembled deliberation of the community on justice
or injustice, and equitable principles rather than legal precedent were the basis for
decision. '' "WDe Tocqueville observed that the justice courts in early America
served as a sort of bridge between the common man and the law. 6' James Willard
Hurst observed in 1950 that the justice of the peace embodied America's emphasis
on autonomous local control, bringing justice "close to each man's door."' 62 James
A. Gazell commented that "[tihe persons elected as justices of the peace, however,
were usually the most trusted members in frontier communities.' 3 These historic
notions have carried forward in recent works on non-lawyer courts. For example,
Professor Provine opines in her book that "[g]iven the extent to which the questions
at this level require judgment, not technical expertise, informality and democratic
influences are probably desirable in most cases."'"
But the actual circumstances in which many American lay judges work today call
into serious question the nostalgic image of the lay adjudicator as the trusted and
wise member of the group of individuals appearing in the court, adjudicating small

158. For example. Professor Provine implies that lay judges are more sensitive than lawyer judges to the
mores and particularities of the community. See PRovms, supra note 61, at 58. 59. See also, PROVNE, supra note
61 at xii; Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participationand SubordinationofPoor Tenants' Voices in Legal
Process, 20 HOFSTRA L REv. 533, 535-36 (1992).
159. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROwTH OF AMERICAN LAW: TIE LAW MAKERS 147-49 (1950);
PRovuqE, supra note 61, at 27 (noting that 'jurisdiction [of American justices of the peace] was always limited to
minor cases"); Pankratz, supra note 82, at 1102-03; Vanlandingham, supra note 36, at 389 ("Ordinarily, the
traditional justice of the peace system may be defined as the administration of petty justice by lay officials paid
by fees.").
160. Id. at 1103; accord Smith, supra note 54.
161. See I A. DE TOCQUEVIIJ.L, DEMOCRACY iNAMERICA 76 (1948) (quoted in PROVINE, supra note 61,
at 29); Gaze/l, supra note 78, at 798; see also Lamber & Lskin, supra note 115, at 297. But see, Smith, supra note
54; Vanlandingham, supra note 36.
162. See HURST,supra note 159, at 148; accord Pound, supra note 2, at 304, 307.
163. Gazell, supra note 78, at 798; accord Vanlandingham, supra note 36, at 391.
164. PRoVINE, supra note 61, at 165.
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disputes in light of community values and without regard for formalistic rules.
Indeed, by perceiving and representing these courts as informal, community-based
tribunals, supporters of the courts justify, and even praise them for, the role they
play without addressing the work they actually do, at least in the civil context. This
section seeks to bring these considerations of myth and reality into the debate.
1. The Myth that all Matters in Limited Jurisdiction Courts Are "Simple"
One of the subtextual, and sometimes even expressed, assumptions about the
civil jurisdiction of non-lawyer courts is that civil matters that come before these
courts are what we normally think of as small claims cases: that is, cases where the
amount incontroversy is small and the legal matters are simple, routine, or not very
complex. 65 To fully analyze this assumption, the notion of "simplicity" must be
broken down into pieces, which considered separately and taken together suggest
that, at least as to civil cases, the cases that come before non-lawyers have the
potential to be quite complex.
a. Jurisdictional Limits Are Not that Low Anymore
The notion of simplicity has often been linked to the amount incontroversy6"6
Thus, to the extent non-lawyer judges have been permitted to retain civil
jurisdiction, they have been allowed to do so only in matters where the amount in
controversy does not exceed a certain amount. Initially this amount was quite low.
For example, in 1979, when the Silberman study was performed, many of the states
that gave non-lawyers jurisdiction over civil matters limited that jurisdiction to no
more than $ 1,000.167
Currently, four states allow non-lawyer judges to adjudicate civil matters where
the amount in controversy is up to $2,500.la" Nine states allow non-lawyer judges
to adjudicate civil matters where the amount in controversy is between $2,500 and
civil matters where
$4,999. " Twelve states allow non-lawyer judges to adjudicate
°
the amount in controversy is between $5,000 and $9,999.'7 Five states allow non-

lawyer judges to adjudicate civil matters where the amount in controversy is
165. Lamber and Luskin contend that "[miost decisions city and town court judges make are not legally
complex." Lamber and Leskin, supra note 112, at 298. They further state that "courts of limited jurisdiction require

fewer demanding legal judgments than general jurisdiction courts." lI Although the Provine and Silberman studies
focused primarily on the criminal jurisdiction of these courts, both professors made comments to this effect. See
PROVINE supra note 59, at 184 ("disputes over liability or responsibility... generally involve issues of fact," and
"theonly significant decisions non-lawyer judges make involve sentencing."); Silberman, supra note 115, at 536
("litigation in lay courts did not usually involve complex legal issues"). This conclusion seems to have been
supported in part by the comments of one of the Arizona justices interviewed for the 1979 study, in which he
indicated that the majority of his civil cases were "simple" contract and tort actions and landlord-tenant matters.
See i& at 532, 534, 537 n.222. Nevertheless, the Silberman study concluded that "the proceedings could give rise
to legal issues that would pose difficulties for non-attorney judges." letat 536.
166. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 115, at 541 (concluding that lay courts should retain civil jurisdiction
"only in 'simple' civil actions where the amount in controversy does not exceed $2,000.").
167. See NON-ATTORNEY JUSTICE, supra note 126, at 266-74.

168. These states are Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana and New Hampshire. See Appendix 2, infra.
169. These states are Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Oregon and
Wyoming. See Appendix 2, infra.
170. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and West Virginia. See Appendix 2, infra.
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between $10,000 and $14,999.' Nine states allow non-lawyer judges to adjudicate
at least some civil matters where the amount in controversy is over $15,000. 172 The
State of Washington, which allows non-lawyer judges to adjudicate civil cases
where the amount in controversy is up to $35,000, has the highest civil
73
jurisdictional limit for non-lawyer judges in the country.
Although these amounts may be low compared to the amount in controversy in
most business litigation, these amounts are not low when taken in the context of an
average individual's life. Residential rental disputes are likely to fall within this
limit. Wage claims for several weeks of work can fall within this limit. Many
consumer purchases fall within this limit. Many service contracts fall within this
limit. In fact, for most individuals, most disputes that could arise in the course of
their lifetime would fall within this limit, with the exception of one's house, one's
job and one's life and limb. Thus, almost any dispute in which the average
individual might become embroiled would be relegated to a non-lawyer judge, no
matter how complex. While these individual suits might not be worth very much
money on some large objective scale, the suits can be of paramount importance to
the parties to the suit.
Additionally, a suit worth a "small" amount of money on a spectrum that includes
all suits in the judicial system can be worth a lot of money to individual litigants
relative to their financial situation. The current minimum wage is $5.15 per hour. 4
A person working a forty-hour week at minimum wage grosses only $206.00 per
week. It would take this person twenty-three weeks-almost half a year-to earn
the current maximum jurisdictional level in some non-lawyer courts. The 1998
Federal Poverty Level for a family of four was $16,450.17 Thus, non-lawyers in
some states adjudicate cases worth eight month's income for a family earning at the
Federal Poverty Level. Finally, as anyone who has worked with the poor knows,
resolution of a dispute over a very small amount of money can mean housing or
homelessness, food or hunger, employment or unemployment, and health care or not
to poor litigants. To these litigants, it is essential that any decision rendered be the
right one-the first time.
Furthermore, even though non-lawyer judges handle only civil cases where the
amount in controversy is relatively low, they collectively adjudicate a tremendous
amount of the litigation that goes on in our society. 76 Thus, non-lawyer judges exert

171. These states are Colorado, Iowa (livestock matters), Kansas, Oklahoma, Tennessee (in some areas). See
Appendix 2, infra.
172. These states are Arkansas (in certain areas only), Delaware, Idaho (in certain areas only), Iowa (in
certain areas only), Louisiana (in certain areas only), Tennessee, Texas (in certain areas only), Washington and
West Virginia (in certain areas only). See Appendix 2, infra.
173. See WASH. REV. CODE § 3.66.020 (1998).
174. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1994).
175. See Department of Health and Human Services Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 63 Fed.
Reg. 9235, 9236 (1998).
176. For example, in a 1995 study of the Arizona justice courts a committee of the Arizona Supreme Court
found that Arizona's limited jurisdiction courts processed ninety percent of the approximately 1.6 million cases
filed in Arizona courts each year. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 31, at app. A, p.1. It has been
pointed out that, "'minor' disputes are major disputes to the parties involved and, when taken collectively,
constitute the major portion of the total workload [of the courts]." Nejelski, supra note 124, at 103; see also
REGINALD HEBER SMmTH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 42 (1919).
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a great deal of influence on individual pieces of economic resource allocation. This
larger picture impact must not be ignored.
Thus, it is no longer true that "[1]ay authority seldom extends to civil disputes
involving large amounts of money or to major crimes, unless the lay persons serve
77
on juries or on mixed benches under the supervision of a lawyer judge.'
Furthermore, because so many suits fall within the "low" jurisdictional cutoffs, we
must be aware that non-lawyer courts will dictate to which elements of society
financial resources may be allocated, whether the interests of individual litigants
that our
will be protected, and whether many members of our society
7 will conclude
society in fact provides the oft-heralded "justice for all."'
b. Complex Legal Issues Can Arise in any Case
The tradition of placing a jurisdictional limit on the civil jurisdiction of nonlawyer judges points to an assumption that because the amount of money in
controversy in a case is comparatively low, the legal issues will not be complex.
Similarly, it is often assumed that certain categories of cases are simple enough for
a layperson to analyze and adjudicate.'79 Of the states that permit lay judges to hear
80
collection
civil matters, many permit those judges to hear contracts cases,
82
81
permit
states
That
cases."I
torts
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cases
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It is easy to see how certain types of cases might be assumed to contain legal
issues simple enough for a non-lawyer judge to adjudicate. One can imagine a
177. PROVmi, supra note 61, at 184.
178. As James Willard Hurst observed:
The jurisdiction of these courts was "minor" in the sense that they were authorized to impose
only limited penalties or to dispose only of cases that involved relatively small sums. But only
in this sense were they minor courts. In terms of human welfare and the practical experience that
masses of people had of'justice" in our society, these courts dealt in issues of first importance.
HURST, supranote 159, at 147; accord Keebler, supra note 100, at 3.
179. For example, the Silberman study, which concluded in general that it is best not to use non-lawyer
judges, identified "simple contract and tort cases" as types of cases which lay judges could be adequately trained
to handle. See Silberman, supra note 115, at 545. See also id. at 535, 541. On the other hand, Professors Lamber
and Laskin, who generally support the role of non-lawyer judges, opined, "In contrast [with criminal law], the law
in civil cases is complicated, or at a minimum unpredictable and wide-ranging." Lamber & Laskin, supra note 145,
at 79. But see Lamber & Luskin, supra note 115, at 298. That a lower court might be faced with difficult legal
issues was recognized by a British appellate judge who complained, "A question which the Divisional Court or
Court of Criminal Appeal, assisted by experienced counsel, would have difficulty answering has to be answered
by the retired farmer, the checkweighman and the school-caretaker." PROVINE, supra note 61, at 186 (citing to an
anonymous author in The Lay Justices: Some Criticisms and Suggestions, CRIM. L REV. 658 (1961)).
180. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 9301 (1974); IDAHO CODE § 1-2208(l)(a)(1) (1994); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 4.370(a) (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 35-3-3(B) (1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 3.66.020(1) (1989).
181. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 9301; IDAHO CODE § 1-2208(1)(a)(4); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9
(1972); OKLA. STAT. tit. 20 § 123(A)(1) (1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 51.080 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3-10(4)

(1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-104(2) (1953).
182. See, e.g., COLO.REV. STAT. § 13-6-104 (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 9301; LA. CODE CIV. P. art.
4912 (West 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. § 4.370(h); S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3-10(10); W.VA. CODE §50-2-1 (1994).

183. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 1-2208(1XaXI); NEV. REV. STAT. § 4.370(b); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 35-3-3(B);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3-10(2); WASH. REV. CODE § 3.66.020(2).
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contracts case where the issues might be largely factual: Did the plaintiff perform
work for the defendant for which he has not been paid? Did the plaintiff sell
something to the defendant for which he has not been paid? Did the defendant pay
the plaintiff? If so, how much? Did the plaintiff pay for something which he did not
receive?
But it is just as easy to imagine a contracts case, seemingly simple, where a host
of complex issues could arise. 84 Take, for example, a case I saw over and over in
practice: a case in which the defendant purchased a used car from the plaintiff for
an amount within the jurisdictional limit of the non-lawyer court. The defendant
claims to have been told by the car salesperson that the car was in good working
order, or will be a good car for the defendant to use for getting to and from work,
or some other such representation. The defendant signs a written contract for the
purchase of the car, and the contract has an integration clause (that is a clause
saying that the writing is the full agreement between the parties). The car is sold "as
is," but the defendant doesn't quite understand what that means. The defendant
takes the car home, and within a very short time the car won't drive. The defendant
contacts the seller to complain, and the seller either refuses to give any assistance
at all, performs a short-term fix-up of the car, or even exchanges it for another car
which operates as poorly as the first. The defendant refuses to make further
payments on the car, or perhaps cannot make further payments on the car because
the defendant's resources have been re-allocated to alternate means of
transportation, or to expensive efforts to repair the car. The plaintiff repossesses the
car, and then files a lawsuit in a non-lawyer court, claiming in the complaint only
that a car was sold to the defendant, that the defendant missed payments, that the
car was repossessed and re-sold, and that a deficiency of several thousand dollars
is owed to the plaintiff.
Many complex legal issues will most certainly arise within this case. The first,
a parole evidence rule issue, is whether any promises made by the seller not
contained in the writing are admissible."8 5 Whether the "as is" warranty disclaimer
is binding on the defendant is an issue under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.186 Whether the contract complies with state and federal consumer statutes
requires an understanding of the Federal Truth in Lending Act,1" 7 the concept of
negotiable instruments under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code'88 (since
some states bar the use of negotiable instruments in consumer contracts), 8 9 the
Federal Trade Commission's Buyer's Guide regulations,"9t and the Federal Trade
Commission's Anti-Holder in Due Course Regulations,' 9 among other things.
Adjudicating fraud requires an understanding of the elements of fraud, the

184. Indeed, the contracts casebooks used to teach in law school are replete with such "simple" cases which
stand for profoundly important, and often complex, common law principles.
185. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1995).
186. See id § 2-316(3)(a).
187. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
188. U.C.C. § 3-104(1990).
189. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 537.3307 (1997) (derived from the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.307
(1974)).
190. 16 C.F.R. §§ 455.1-455.7 (1998).
191. 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1433.3.
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difference between a fact and an opinion and when one has the right to rely on each,
and the difference between common law fraud, and statutory fraud."9
Likewise, within a debt collection case, another type of case frequently
adjudicated by the justice court, a number of complex issues regularly arise. First,
the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 193 governs the conduct of debt
collectors. Although the act on its face is quite simple in its regulation of conduct
by debt collectors, it contains a number of formal prescriptions with which debt
collectors must comply."9 Only someone with knowledge of the Act or the ability
to research the Act and the many cases decided thereunder would be able to bring
these factors to bear in adjudicating a case. Furthermore, many issues, such as who
is a debt collector,' what is a debt,' 96 and what would be likely to mislead a
consumer, 97 are still unsettled under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
Addressing these issues requires legal knowledge. A debt collection case also raises
issues under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, such as whether an
instrument is negotiable 9 ' and whether the holder of the instrument is a holder in
due course, 99 who takes free of most defenses the obligor might have.'
Similarly, complex legal issues can arise in landlord tenant cases 2", student loan
cases, and even home ownership cases, which do not always involve a large amount
in controversy.' For example, in the second case discussed at the beginning of this
article, a landlord tenant/waste case, the court was forced to rule on a motion to
disqualify the attorney for the plaintiff, who was a material witness and one of two
partners in the partnership plaintiff.3 The court was also required to rule on a

192. For an example of this type of fraud, see Arizona's Consumer Fraud Statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
44-1521 to 44-1534 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).
193. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
194. For example, the "mini-Miranda" warning section requires all correspondence with a debtor to say "that
the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that
purpose ... " See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1 1) (1994 & Supp. H 1996). Another section requires collectors to notify
debtors of their right to dispute the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (1994).
195. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); see also, e.g., Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995); Garrett v. Derbes, 110
F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 1997); Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1992); Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566 (3d
Cir. 1989); Vasquez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 937 F. Supp. 773 (N.D.m. 1996); Griffin v. Bailey & Assoc. Inc., 855 F.
Supp. 1047 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
196. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5); see also, e.g., Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. 119 F.3d 922 (1 th
Cir. 1997); Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997); Zimmerman v.
HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1987); Sarver v. Capital Recovery Assoc., Inc., 951 F. Supp. 550
(E.D. Pa. 1996); Azar v. Hayter, 874 F. Supp. 1314 (N.D. Fla. 1995), affid 66 F.3d 342 (11th Cir. 1995).
197. See 16 U.S.C. § 1692e.
198. See U.C.C. § 3-104 (1990).
199. See id. § 3-302.
200. See id. § 3-305.
201. But see Smith v. Justice of the Peace Court No. 1, 1990 WL 123051 (Del. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 1990)
(finding that Delaware justices of the peace are competent to adjudicate issues that arise under Delaware's
Landlord-Tenant Code, 25 DEL. CODE §§ 5101-7014).
202. See, e.g., O'Barr & Conley, supra note 1, at 155 (discussing a case involving an illegal lockout of the
tenant and resultant damages).
203. The memorandum I submitted on this issue required consideration of several ethical rules and cases,
including Ethical Rule 3.7 (prohibiting a lawyer who is a witness from acting as an advocate); Cottonwood Estates,
Inc. v. Paradise Builders, Inc., 624 P.2d 296 (Ariz. 1981) (prohibiting attorney who executed deeds on behalf of
corporation from representing corporation in litigation involving the deeds); Hunt Inv. Co. v. Eliot, 742 P.2d 858,
863-64 (Ariz. Ct App. 1987) (holding that a partner not acting as attorney for the partnership can only represent
his own interest in the partnership, not the partnership itself).
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motion to compel discovery and a motion for protective order during the course of
the case. Each of the two motions was briefed extensively by both sides, citing case
and statutory law. Yet the judge ruling on these motions was not schooled in the
law.
Thus, the common categorical assignments granted to non-lawyer judges are
quite broad, and the areas identified as those that a non-lawyer can adjudicate
contain some of law's most complex matters. In the cases I handled, more often than
not, these types of complex legal issues were present. Nevertheless, it would be
difficult to raise these issues before a non-lawyer judge with any confidence that
they could be adequately addressed. In the myriad of cases where a lawyer is not
involved, it is likely these issues would go completely unaddressed, since the judge
would not have the requisite legal background to raise these issues sua sponte. ° 4
The complexities of these cases become of greater concern when these cases
make up a large part of the civil docket of the court. Thus, states must determine
how prevalent these types of cases are. Based on research already done, it would
appear that these types of cases, where the individual defendant might have complex statutory defenses, make up a large part of the civil docket. 5 In one of the only
studies to address this issue, the author looked at a random sampling of 2,079 cases
that had been filed in the small claims court of Middlesex County in London,
Ontario, Canada. 6 That study found that of the cases studied, "consumer issues
were at the heart of 33 percent of all disputed cases (21 percent involving businesses versus consumers and 12 percent involving consumers versus businesses).
Other individual versus business disputes (i.e., landlord/tenant, employer/employee,
financial institution/debtor) accounted for an additional 25 percent of the cases."'
Surely, if this were the finding in regard to the caseload of a limited jurisdiction
court it would call into question any decision to use non-lawyer judges, who almost
necessarily would have insufficient ability to protect the individual rights implicated
in these litigation pairings.
c. Many Non-Lawyer Judges Are Required to Follow the
Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence
One author who argued for a constitutional right to counsel in all cases
commented that "Over the years, state decisions have brought the American legal
system from a point where it was used and operated by laymen to a system
'inundated with technicalities of procedure and nuances of law which present

204. The legal ability of the judge in cases where parties are unrepresented is of particular importance given
the apparent increase in self-representation in our court system. See, e.g., Laura Parker and Gary Fields, Do-ItYourself Law Hits Courts, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 22, 1999, at 3A.
205. See Neil Vidmar, The Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes and an Empirical
Investigation, 18 L & Soc'Y REV. 515 (1984).
206. See id.

207. ld. at 531. The same article mentions a case in which the outcome turned on "whether, under the law,
the plaintiff's contributory negligence required that she assume the burden of the remaining one-fourth [of the
damages]." Id. at 541.
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incomprehensible barriers to laymen who seek access to the courts'." 2 8 This
observation is certainly supported when one looks at the rules that govern lawsuits
before non-lawyer judges. These rules have come a long way from the informal
setting that was the trademark of the community non-lawyer tribunal. Indeed, the
procedural and evidentiary rules that govern many non-lawyer courts today have
made them virtually indistinguishable from general jurisdiction courts, where
judges must be lawyers.'
That these rules are difficult to comprehend and apply is apparent in a number
of ways. First, in most law schools Civil Procedure is a full year course, while most
other courses are taught in one semester. Similarly, evidence is a four-credit hour,
rather than a three-credit hour class in many law schools, a designation saved in
most schools for the most difficult upper level courses. In his dissent in North v.
Russell,2 ° Justice Stewart opined that applying the rules of evidence is a task for
which non-lawyer judges are not well prepared. Others have made the same
observation,"' and concluded that for this reason lay judges should be barred from
conducting jury trials.
Complying with evidentiary and procedural rules is difficult even for those
persons who have attended law school. This is illustrated by the number of
continuing legal education and mock trial opportunities available each year on these
subjects. The same difficulties become apparent to anyone who has tried to handle
a case in a lawyer-adjudicated court without the assistance of counsel.
Thus, in many states the non-lawyer courts have been made into smaller versions
of the state's general jurisdiction courts. Yet the myths that persist about the
simplicity of civil cases brought in these courts and the procedural rules in these
courts have made it possible for advocates and observers of lay courts to continue
to maintain that a law degree is not needed.2" 3 The result is that litigants are left in
the undesirable position of appearing before uninformed adjudicators, and nonlawyer judges are left in the unenviable position of finding out that they are not well
trained for the job.2"4
2. The Myth that Justice Courts Serve One Class or Group of Litigants
Another dominant image of the justice court is that it is a place where litigants
of a single group or class bring disputes between themselves to be adjudicated by
a judge who is also a member of the same group or class. The problem with this

208. Pankratz, supra note 82, at 1110 (quoting Lester Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways though the Legal
Process: The Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U. L REV. 595, 617-618
(1973)).
209. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 22-211 (1992); UTAH R. Civ. P. l(a) (1998); NEV.-JUSTICES' COURTS
R. Civ. P. (1998). For a discussion of the natural conflict between lay discourse and the rules of evidence, see
William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court
Narratives, 19 L & Soc'Y REv. 661 (1985).
210. 427 U.S. 328, 342, 344 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
211. See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 115, at 536, n.220.
212. See id at 542 ("Non-attorneys should not have to deal with the complexities of the voir dire or thread
their way through the labyrinthine rules of evidence.").
213. Professors Luskin and Lamber maintain that "[e]xisting evidence does not show that lawyers and
nonlawyers differ in how they judge." Lamber & Luskin, supra note 115, at 297.
214. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at 187-88 (regarding the desires of non-lawyerjudges to be better trained).
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image is that, in modem times, many civil cases that must be adjudicated in nonlawyer courts are not between individuals on equal footing, but rather are between
members of different groups. This was evidenced by the Vidmar study, which found
that at least half of the cases filed in the court were filed by larger businesses
against individuals.2 15 Similarly, the authors of a 1975 study of Iowa's newly
created magistrate courts, which had replaced the justice of the peace courts but
continued to allow non-lawyer judges, found that the typical civil plaintiff in these
courts represented business and debt collection interests against individual
defendants.216 A like observation was made in 1972 by a judge who, in describing
the D.C. Small Claims Court, observed that "the court.., is primarily the court of
the skilled lawyer representing large debt collection companies, credit stores,
corporate defendants and insurance companies."2 7 Indeed, historically the cases
litigated in limited jurisdiction courts have pitted powerful business interests against
individuals. In 1919, Reginald Heber Smith observed that justices of the peace
"formed8 unholy alliances with collection agencies, installment houses, and the
21
like."
Even some of the categorical types of cases typically authorized to be litigated
in non-lawyer courts necessarily pit more powerful interests against individuals. For
example, a landlord filing a case against a tenant has several advantages over the
tenant that clearly separate the landlord into a different and more privileged group
than the tenant. First, the landlord owns property, an American dream to which
many aspire but cannot attain. Second, the landlord, unless he owns very little rental
property, is likely to have experience litigating other similar cases. Thus, the
landlord, as a repeat player, may have experience with the very judge before whom
he is appearing, and thus may be able to rely on his prior relationship with the judge
in knowing what to expect, how to act, and what the judge will see as relevant to a
resolution in the landlord's favor.21 9 Furthermore, the landlord may have an attorney
who regularly takes on these cases on the landlord's behalf, or who at least advises
the landlord in regard to what is required, for example, to evict a tenant properly or
retain a security deposit.2' The tenant, on the other hand, may have difficulty

215. See Vidmar, supra note 200, at 528. However, the focus of this part of the study was on what types of
cases lead to defaults, rather than disputes. See id. at 526-27. I feel obligated to point out my disagreement with

the study's assumption that where there was no dispute raised by the defendant the business plaintiff s claim must
have been "clear and unequivocal," a conclusion drawn by the authors based on the types of plaintiffs against
whom no response was raised, such as "banks, department stores, and utility companies" and interviews with
collection agencies. ld at 530. It does not seem possible that these types of plaintiffs could know whether there is
a defense.
216. See Green et al., supra note 74, at 387 (finding that 67.9% of the justices of the peace surveyed said that
business interests wer the typical plaintiff in their court, while 89.1% of magistrates, who replaced justices of the
peace, reported that business interests were the typical plaintiff in their court).
217. CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY, zrr.JE INJUSTICES: SMALL CLAIM COURTS AND THE AMERICAN
CONSUMER 98 (1972) (quoted in Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of
Lawyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL L REV. 79, 118 (1997)).
218. SMITH, supra note 176, at 42; accord Gazell, supra note 78, at 810.
219. For a description of accommodations made to landlords in Baltimore, Maryland's rent court, see Barbara
Bezdek, supra note 158.
220. See Vidmar, supra note 205, at 535 (concluding in his study of cases in the Middlesex County, Canada
small claims court "that businesses are more likely to be represented by counsel and more likely to be repeat
players.").
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complying with the formalistic requirements of making a complaint about the
condition of the property or some other defect that might be interjected into the
lawsuit if proper procedures were followed.22
Similarly, a debt collector is likely to have many advantages over a debtor sued
in a limited jurisdiction court. A party whose purpose is to collect debts is likely to
have a great deal more litigation experience than the average person, and is also
more likely to have access to legal counsel. This, in turn, can provide great
advantage over the average debtor. As described by one court administrator,
commenting on collection cases adjudicated by non-lawyer judges in his state
before non-lawyers were prohibited from becoming judges in his state:
Lawyer judges can't be razzle-dazzled about the law. I can guarantee you, that
used to happen a great deal, particularly in the area of collections. The creditor's
attorney would come into court and say, "Now look, your honor, the law is thus
and so. The defendant has got to pay us everything," but in fact the defendant
might have had a good defense to the claim.'
A similar observation was made in 1924 by the Attorney General for the State of
Kansas, who in a letter to Chester H. Smith remarked, "The worst trouble about
Justices of the Peace, however, is that so many times some man is elected who does
not hold himself aloof from being misled by some unscrupulous lawyer." 3
The uneven balance of power in limited jurisdiction courts is evidenced by one
of the stories recounted by O'Barr and Conley. In that case, a woman sued a garage
owner who had sold her a defective engine.' The authors observed the following
about the defendant's response to the woman's complaints:
The owner was an experienced businessman who ran the garage with his father.
He did not respond to the woman's recounting of her troubles. Instead, he talked
about his limited legal duty to the woman, as evidenced by the written form
contract that he produced, and asserted that he had met that limited duty, making
specific reference to actions that he had taken and offers that he had made. The
magistrate accepted his characterization of the relationship without question or
discussion.'2
Thus, far from being places where members of the same group or class can argue
amongst themselves, non-lawyer courts are often venues for cases by the haves
against the have nots - landlords against tenants, debt collectors against debtors,
merchants against customers. Therefore, before legislatures, bar associations and
state courts can safely conclude that by using non-lawyer judges the limited
jurisdiction courts achieve the goal of self-governance by the clientele using the
court, the cases filed in these courts must be carefully studied. This study must
include categorization of plaintiffs and defendants by relevant definition, such as

221. See generally, Bezdek, supra note 158.
222. Ashman & Chapin, supra note 135, at 420; see also Bezdek, supra note 158, at 580 (recognizing that
consumer defendants in collection suits may not be aware of defenses available to them).
223. Letter from C.B. Griffith, Attorney General of Kansas, to Chester H. Smith (Jan. 4, 1924) (quotedin
Smith, supra note 54,at 122 n.19).
224. See O'Barr& Conley, supra note 209.
225. Id. at 688 (Note that it is not clear whether this magistrate was an attorney).
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landlord v. tenant; tenant v. landlord; consumer v. business; business v. consumer;
and individual v. individual. 6 If a state finds that the litigation pairings in its nonlawyer courts involve litigants who are not of the same status, then the notion of
non-lawyer courts as a forum that preserves adjudication "by the people, for the
people""2 7 must be discarded. In that event, the civil jurisdiction of non-lawyer
judges must be maintained only if defensible on some other grounds.
3.

The Myth that a Judge Can Be the Personification of Community Standards in the Heterogeneity that Is Modem American Life
The clientele of limited jurisdiction courts is not only economically diverse, it is
diverse in other respects. The jurisdiction of limited jurisdiction courts is
determined geographically. This, of course, means that the larger the geographic
area served by the court, the more diverse the clientele served by the court. For
example, in Arizona the jurisdiction of the Phoenix justice courts is divided into
seven areas. Within each area there are wealthy and poor neighborhoods; Christians,
Jews and Muslims; men and women; young and old; and individuals who are
Hispanic, Native American and Caucasian. In other words, the jurisdiction of each
court is descriptively quite diverse."
This contrasts significantly with the historical jurisdiction of lay courts, which
often operated in homogeneous frontier communities.229 In those communities, it
might have been possible to determine a set of local community values that a lay
adjudicator could discern and bring to bear in adjudicating disputes between
members of the community. Perhaps this is still possible in the smallest rural
communities today, which may explain perpetuation of the notion of the non-lawyer
court as a community tribunal through which a community can define itself. 3
Nevertheless, it is a fact of American life that many communities are no longer
homogeneous, but are rather quite diverse.
It is the essence of democracy that in a diverse society the rules that govern the
conduct of the society's members are worked out through constant compromise and
readjustments based on community members' conflicting ideas, needs and goals.
This sort of constant adjustment of rights between societal members is essential in
a heterogeneous society, where it would be unusual, if not impossible, to find
socially constructed, uniformly recognized group notions about the rights of the

226. For an example of similar categories used in a study with a different focus, see Vidmar, supra note 205,
at 526-27.
227. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (1863).

228. The diversity of urban populations was cited by Roscoe Pound as a challenge to the administration of
justice in modem cities. See Pound, supra note 2, at 311.
229. Roscoe Pound observed that to understand the administration ofjustice in American cities, one would
first have to "perceive the problems of administration ofjustice in a homogeneous pioneer or nral community of
the first half of the nineteenth century" which he then contrasted with "the problems of administration ofjustice
in a modem urban community." Id. at 303.
230. See, e.g., Lamber & Luskin, supra note 145, at 82-83 ('That these courts have [endured], despite social,
economic, and technical change and in the face of considerable hostility, attests to their importance to their
communities. Local autonomy implies the ability of a community to define itself by its choices, and the choices
a community makes within this sphere tell us something about how the community defines itself."); Lamber &
Luskin, supra note 115, at 295-96. For a narrative of legal life in a modem small town, see Mark Curriden, SmallTown Justice, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 64.
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community's members. Rather, the group notions that emerge in a heterogeneous
society about conduct, rights and acceptable outcomes do so in the form of
law-both statutory and common. Law in our society is, after all, the democratic
resolution of conflicts arising out of our heterogeneity. To the extent there are group
values that cut across the diversity of the governed, those values will certainly be
" ' In this way, the rights of all groups are
reflected in the laws of the system.23
continuously balanced and re-balanced by legislatures and through the application
of law to the facts of a specific case.
Because heterogeneous communities have diverse populations, with varying
beliefs and standards, it is not possible to create a court that personifies local values
for purposes of adjudicating disputes between members of the community. Rather,
such a court can only emerge from communities with an identifiable, over-arching
grouping. It is for this reason that one of the most prevalent examples of a
successful civil dispute resolution system officiated by laymen is that of the Tribal
peacemaker in Native American cultures.232 But individual Native communities
possess notions so prevalent in the community over which the peacemaker has
jurisdiction that they provide a common basis for reaching adjudicated decisions.2 33
Most communities served by a non-lawyer judge, particularly urban areas, lack this
commonality. Thus, the lay judge given power to adjudicate the disputes that arise
between members of the community within the court's jurisdiction has no common
rules to apply in adjudicating the case. Rather, the judge must apply either the law
as reflected in the state's statutory and common law, or the law as he or she believes
it to be-a sort of ad hoc construction of norms as the judge perceives them to be,
rather than norms dictated by caselaw. But where parties are likely to come from
diverse sectors of the community, it is not possible for the lay adjudicator to make
decisions which comport with the parties' differing norms. This leaves the lay
adjudicator with no set of values to be applied in adjudication as an alternative to
law, and yet the lay adjudicator is most certainly not in as good a position as a
lawyer to apply the law.
The non-lawyer justice court model, which assumes that the judge reflects the
values of some identifiable, unique group served by the court, ignores the
heterogeneity of the groups served by each of the courts and falsely recognizes a
community standard where, in fact, there are likely to be multiple communities,
with varying often conflicting standards. Nevertheless, we seem to assume that the
pronouncements of non-lawyer judges reflect a discernible community standard,
even if a lawyer judge would reach a different result. I suggest that what we have
done, instead, is substitute the more democratic community standard reflected by
statutory and case law, for a more fleeting appearance of a community standard that
231. For an article recognizing that community values are embodied in the laws of a society, see Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984). In discussing the role of the judge Fiss says, "Their job is not
to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and giveforce to the values
embodied in authoritativetexts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality
into accord with them." Id. at 1085 (emphasis added).
232. For a discussion of the Navajo peacemaking process and why it could not be readily transported to nonIndian communities, see Carole E. Goldberg, Overextended Borrowing: Tribal PeacemakingApplied in NonIndian Disputes, 72 WASH. L REv. 1003 (1997).
233. See id.
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cannot exist in a heterogeneous community. Worse yet, we may have replaced law's
resolution of the conflicts between community members with the view of the
majority, as personified by the judge.
Given the diversity of the clientele that is served by limited jurisdiction courts,
it is not possible to have a single community standard which would be reflected in
the rulings of the non-lawyer judge. In light of this contemporary reality, we must
be careful not to draw analogies between present-day non-lawyer courts and either
the non-lawyer courts that once existed, when communities were less diverse, or the
non-lawyer courts currently in existence which serve heterogeneous communities,
such as Tribal Courts.
B. Replacing Myths with Information
Once the myths about civil cases in non-lawyer courts have been discarded, they
must be replaced by a true picture of what non-lawyer courts actually do in civil
cases. This inquiry requires both a statistical analysis of what is expected currently
of non-lawyer judges, such as whether they are required to follow state statutory
and common law, and observation of how these judges perform in the civil arena.
The latter inquiry necessarily requires observation of non-lawyer judges by lawyers
who can assess the outcomes of cases adjudicated by non-lawyers .23
It is this second inquiry--the kind of inquiry that would uncover the stories told
in this article-which seems to have been ignored in places where it could provide
the most important information relevant to non-lawyer judge's civil capabilities. 235
Furthermore, states cannot rely on the conclusions reached in studies that look
primarily at the criminal work of non-lawyer judges for help in determining whether
non-lawyer judges should be permitted to retain jurisdiction over civil matters, even
when the conclusions reached in those studies purport to address the full jurisdiction of non-lawyer courts.2 36 The skills needed to adjudicate liability on a traffic

234. It has been suggested to me that any thorough review of these courts should include a study of what nonlawyer judges do better than lawyer judges, particularly in regard to how the judges relate to the litigants in these
courts. While this is an important component of a full study of these courts, I believe these matters are secondary
in courts where the judges are expected to know and apply all aspects of the law. To my mind, the ability to
comprehend and discover the law that is required to be applied in cases is of primary importance. Once the court
is structured so that this concern is addressed, there will be other matters of great importance, such as assisting
judges in conducting court in a litigant-sensitive manner.
235. For example, Arizona's 1995 study of its limited jurisdiction courts, while quite comprehensive, seems
to have paid little, if any, attention to civil case studies. Nevertheless, the study recommends raising the civil
jurisdictional limit of the limited jurisdiction courts to $10,000. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
31, at 23. This recommendation was made even though the study recognizes that "cases filed in limited jurisdiction
court are becoming more complex and do require competent, capable judicial officers." Id. at 27.
236. For articles that have made conclusions about the effectiveness of non-lawyer judges after studying
primarily their criminal jurisdiction, see PROVINE supra note 61; Harris, supranote 151; Lamber & Luskin, supra
note 115; Lamber & Luskin, supra note 145, at 78-79 (finding that Indiana's non-lawyer judges did not handle
many civil cases, and thus paid little attention to those civil cases that they do handle); Silberman, supra note 115,
at 523-31; Vanlandingham, supranote 36. For an annotation of cases which have addressed the requirement that
judges have law training, see Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Validity and Constructionof Constitutionalor
Statutory Provision Making Legal Knowledge or Experience a Condition of Eligibilityfor JudicialOffice, 71
A.LR.3d 498 (1977). For an example of this focus in a government report, see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
62 and NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS 162 (1973).

That civil jurisdiction considerations have been inadequately addressed is not all that surprising since much of
the jurisdiction of limited jurisdiction courts is over criminal matters. Again, in 1991, civil cases made up only 12%
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ticket are not necessarily the same as the skills needed to adjudicate even the most

simple contracts or torts case.
Finally, states must not rely on non-lawyer judge's assessments of their own
capabilities in civil cases when re-examining the civil jurisdiction of non-lawyers.
A non-lawyer judge who has never been to law school, handled a case before a
lawyer judge, or spent a significant amount of time in a courtroom presided over by
a lawyer judge, is simply incapable of making this judgment. I am not suggesting
that non-lawyer judges should be excluded from participation in an examination of
what their jurisdiction should be in the future. However, the participation should not
be merely conclusory.237 Rather than asking judges whether they believe they are
competent to handle civil cases that come before them, studies should focus on
questions such as whether there have been cases during which the non-lawyer judge
wished he or she knew what "the law" was in a certain area, or felt at a disadvantage when legal points were made before him or her by lawyers, and whether the
non-lawyer judge ever did research on legal points in order to make decisions." Of
course, even these types of questions may fail to paint a true picture of how often
non-lawyer judges have difficulty applying the law, since a lay judge might not
know that law on a certain point exists.
Only an examination of the cases that have come before non-lawyer judges, and
whether legal issues presented by the cases were recognized and properly analyzed
by non-lawyer judges, can answer with any certainty questions about the competence of non-lawyer judges to adjudicate civil cases. Furthermore, only a realist's
look at the cases being directed to non-lawyer judges will address the question of

of the cases heard nationally in limited jurisdiction courts. See CASELOAD STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
148, at 7. Historically it seems to be true that the primary focus for limited jurisdiction courts has been traffic and
other such matters, with civil cases making up a small part of the docket. See, e.g., PROViNE, supra note 61, at 93
("Civil and small claims cases also constitute a small portion of most dockets."). Furthermore, constitutional
concerns are more serious in regard to the criminal jurisdiction of limited jurisdiction courts.
237. For example, the study conducted by Professors Lamber and Luskin asked the judges surveyed to
conclude whether they had the capacity to address the issues that came before them. See Lamber & Luskin, supra
note 115, at 296, 298. Eighty-six percent of the judges surveyed indicated that their training was adequate to
address the civil cases that came before them. See id at 298-99. The authors of this study perceived that inability
to be impartial was the main criticism of non-lawyer judges, not capacity to analyze legal issues adequately. See
id. at 298. Thus, the study focused on rebutting criticism of non-lawyer judges' ability to be impartial.
The Provine study asked the non-lawyer judges surveyed whether they believed there was a significant
difference between attorney and non-attorney judges. See PRoVINE, supra note 61, at 196. Question 36 of the
survey asked:
In New York, some judges at this level in the judicial system are attorneys. Do you believe there
are significant differences between attorney and nonattomey judges?
wi yes
- no. Please explain:
ld While this question elicits more than just a response regarding non-lawyer judges' views of their own
capabilities, this is an implicit part of this question.
238. Professor Provine's report did find that most of the judges observed kept code books and other reference
material at their desk. PROVINE, supra note 61, at 97. The report also discusses a justice who kept "a two-room
suite full of law books, including a complete set of all published New York cases." d at 97. Professor Silberman's
study found that when legal questions arose some lay judges turned to attorneys or lawyer judges for assistance,
and "most judges said they relied on statutes or benchbooks provided to them or used legal materials from a local
law library." Silberman, supra note 115, at 537. However, the Silberman study focused on the majority of cases
in lay courts, which are criminal matters, and the judges themselves indicated that they were not faced with many
"legal questions" in these types of cases. See id Professor Silberman's study did ask what the non-attorney judges
surveyed did if they had a question about the law, and whether they consulted with anyone when they had a legal
question upon which to rule. See NON-ATtORNEY JuSTICE, supra note 126, at 328.
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whether the judges in these courts should be required to have a law degree. It is
impossible to determine whether a law degree is important to the ability to serve as
a judge until one determines what tasks will be required of the judge.
C. The Importance of a Law Degree to the Ability to Serve as a Judge
1. Matching Judicial Requirements with the Tasks of the Job and the Needs
of the Court Clientele
Based on my experiences in civil cases before non-lawyer judges, I believe most
states that endeavor to replace the myths of non-lawyer courts with reality will find
that many civil cases currently directed to non-lawyer judges are virtually
indistinguishable from cases directed to the state's lawyer-officiated, general
jurisdiction courts, except for the amount in controversy. Given the jurisdictional
limit of many limited jurisdiction courts, the rules that must be followed in these
courts, and the complexity of the civil cases that are permitted and sometimes
forced to be brought in these courts, new attention must be given to the question of
whether judges allowed to adjudicate civil matters in these courts should have law
degrees.
This debate must start with the recognition that except in the rarest of circumstances it is difficult, if not impossible, to master the law, even for the most devoted
and sincere non-lawyer judges.239 The desire to understand and accurately apply the
law, and the ability to do so, are simply not one and the same. Our entire legal
education system is based on the belief that understanding law is a process that
requires direction, guided reflection and trial and error. The days when we believed
that one could become proficient in the complexities of the law by simply studying
the law independently are long gone."4 To a great degree the barriers to becoming

239. Jeffrey Pankratz acknowledged that "[s]tatutes and judicial decisions are written in such a way that they
are fully intelligible only to the legally trained." Pankratz, supra note 82, at 1109. Regarding the dedication of nonlawyer judges, Professor Provine recounts the story of one non-lawyer judge who
even teaches evidence at a nearby fireman's academy. This justice also had published opinions
and had persuaded a leading form company to correct an error in its seal order form. He works
from his car-repair shop, a grimy establishment strewn with old motors, spare parts, filthy rags,
and empty oil cans, but equipped with a two-room suite full of law books, including a complete
set of all published New York cases.
PROVINE, supranote 61, at 97.

240. The modern belief that legal education is essential to developing adequate analytical skills is reflected
in the standards for bar admission in the United States. Of the fifty states, the District of Columbia and the four
U.S. possessions, thirty-five require graduation from an ABA-approved law school for initial applicants to the bar.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AND NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, 1997-98.

Eleven mor allow graduates from some law schools unapproved by the ABA, either in or out of the state, to
apply for admission to the bar. Even then, two of these (Alabama and Colorado) require that the applicant have
practiced in the state where the unaccredited law school is located for a minimum number of years. Two of these
states, Georgia and North Carolina, are moving to a system where only ABA-approved law school graduates are
eligible to apply for membership in the bar.
Only eight states indicate that they permit individuals who have engaged in law office study to apply for initial
admission to their state bar. Even in these eight states, the rules are limited as follows:
In Alaska, "The clerkship program is provided for by statute but has not been implemented by the University

of Alaska in recent years. Applicants who are not graduates of ABA-approved law schools may be eligible to take
the bar exam if they have been licensed to practice for five years and were engaged in the practice of law during
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a lawyer, such as maintaining a minimum grade point average in law school and
passing a bar exam, serve as a sieve through which only those with not merely the
desire, but also the ability and training, can pass. When this filter is not applied to
the judicial pool, a significant check on the abilities of the judiciary is lost.
Critics might downplay the importance of a law degree as anything but a
professional credential.2" Some even suggest that success in law school is merely
a measure of conformity to standards set by an in-group of professionals, so that
academic success reflects political and social conformity (and white male values)
22
rather than a student's ability to grasp and analyze legal issues. ' But this ignores
the number of law school classes that are not doctrinal, but instead require statutory
interpretation or other such disciplined analysis. When a student in my Payment
Systems class (Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code) gets a marginal
grade, it is because the student doesn't know or understand the intricacies of the
U.C.C. When a student in my Contracts class gets a marginal grade it is often
because the student did not understand even the basic concepts of contract law, such
as offer and acceptance or consideration, not because there was some political or
doctrinal difference between myself and the student. And so it goes with many law
school classes, as with practicing law. A student who cannot comprehend statutory
rules is likely to have difficulty in the practice of law. To a great degree, a law
student's grade point average reflects the student's basic ability to understand and
apply law. Thus, it is fair to view grade point averages and bar examinations as a
method for weeding out the willing but unable. One is fully prepared for adjudicating civil cases only if one receives complete training as a lawyer and is able to

those five years."
In California, "Applicants who obtain legal education by attending unaccredited law schools, through
correspondence or by law office study, must take an examination after their first year. Applicants who pass the

examination within three consecutive administrations of first becoming eligible to take it will receive credit for all
law study completed to the date of the administration of the examination passed. Applicants who pass it on a
subsequent attempt will receive credit for only one year of study."
In Maine, "Applicants may have graduated from a law school accredited by the jurisdiction where it is located
and have been admitted to practice by exam within the U.S. and have been in the active practice of law for at least
3 years; or 2) have completed 2/3 of graduation requirements from an ABA-accredited law school and within 12
months after successful completion pursued the study of law in the law office of an attorney in active practice of
law in Maine on a full-time basis for at least one (1) year; provided that the attorney must, in advance, present the
proposed course of study to the Board for its approval and, at its conclusion, certify that the course, as approved,
was completed."
In New York, "lawoffice study [is] permitted after successful completion of one year at an ABA-approved law
school. Graduates of non-ABA-approved law schools can write the examination if they have at least five years

active and continuous practice within the last seven years in some other state or states."

In Virginia, "Currently no non-ABA-approved law school is approved by the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners."
In Washington, "Currently no non-ABA-approved law school is approved by the Washington Board of Bar
Examiners."
In Wyoming, "Law office study [is] permitted as a structured course comparable to balance of up to 2 years at
an ABA accredited law school (by statute). Prior approval of independent study required."
241. See, e.g., PROVINE, supra note 61, at 170, 174.
242. See, e.g., Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law
School. 143 U. PA. L REV. 1, 69-71 (1994). Others have criticized law school as a process whereby emotion and
logic are deemed oppositional pairings, with emotion discarded and logic exalted. See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note
158, at 594.
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demonstrate competence by maintaining a certain grade point average and passing
the bar examination.24 3
Defenders of non-lawyer judge courts argue that lawyers' interest in restricting
judicial office to those with law degrees results from territorialism by the bar2 and
elitism, 4 5 and is merely reflective of American society's push to professionalize
dispute resolution. 6 But when the tasks required of a non-lawyer judge involve
interpretation and application of statutes and case law, obedience to procedural
rules, which rules may have been interpreted by the courts, and legal research, it can
hardly be said that any efforts by the Bar to require that these judges be formally
trained in the law is a collective exercise in self-preservation and promotion. 7
Rather, it is a recognition of the kinds of matters that will be addressed in these
courts. It is not universally true that "skill in negotiation, ability to manage limited
resources, and common sense are more significant to judicial effectiveness at this
level" than legal training.2' Many limited jurisdiction court judges are required to
apply something other than common sense. They are required to adjudicate as if
they were trained as lawyers. Only training as lawyers can ensure these judges can
perform their tasks competently.
2.

Even the Most Sympathetic Non-Lawyer Judge Is Not Better Equipped
to Protect the Interests of the Common Man than a Lawyer Judge
Given the legal nature of the tasks required of limited jurisdiction court judges
in civil cases, allowing non-lawyers to take these positions is defensible only if
there are other, overriding justifications for using non-lawyer judges. Some studies
have suggested that this justification can be found in the tendency of the non-lawyer
judge, himself a member of the less privileged class, to be more likely to want to
protect the interests of the less privileged.249 The essence of this assumption is that

243. Indeed, many states require more, maintaining rules that prohibit lawyers from becoming judges until
they have practiced for a certain, minimum number of years. See Appendix 3, infra.
244. See, e.g., PROVINE, supra note 61, at 170 (assuming that a law degree is insignificant to adjudicating
limited jurisdiction court cases and suggesting that the lawyer's sense of self-importance makes him unable to
"concede the insignificance of credentials to decision making."); see also, Green et al., supra note 74, at 389

(stating that many justices of the peace who had been replaced by lawyer-selected magistrates maintained that "the
basic reason for the reform was to support the professional interests of the bar").
245. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at xiii. Professor Provine maintains that some control by the legal
profession helps:
make the nonprofessional's role more palatable to lawyers. Lay judges, on the other hand,
operate independent of professional authority, and they even have the power to discipline
lawyers who appear before them. It should be no surprise that this form of lay participation has
provoked the loudest complaints from lawyers and the bar's most sustained efforts at reform.
Id.

246. See i. at xii.
247. This observation was made as long ago as 1927, when Chester H. Smith observed that because of our
"highly technical and specialized body of law ... It is as inconsistent to assume that a layman can administer law
correctly as it is to assume that a litigant should go to a blacksmith to have his dental work done or to a farmer to
have a cost accounting problem in manufacturing worked out." Smith, supra note 54, at 124.
248. See PROVIN9, supra note 61, at 81.
249. One article expressly recognized this assumption. See Green et al., supra note 74, at 388 ("Justices of
the peace are far less likely to be legally educated than magistrates. It might therefore by [sic) hypothesized that
justices of the peace are more likely to base their decisions upon a sense ofjustice or equity than upon the letter
of the law, hence extenuating circumstances and similar factors are thought to be more salient to 'citizen judges."').
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a judge from a lower socio-economic class will be more likely to be sympathetic

with the less privileged person in litigation between that person and a more
powerful or stationed opponent.
Determining whether or not this assumption is true requires an examination of
such things as: whether non-lawyer judges are members of a different socioeconomic class than lawyer judges;' whether, having attained a judgeship, a nonlawyer judge can still be considered a part of the less privileged class; whether
lawyer judges, just because they have more education or a higher salary than
individual litigants in the court, will be unable to identify with the needs of the
individual litigants; 25 1 and whether such a judge would not be swayed by a litigant
with privilege and power. Determining who is most likely to be most protective of
the litigant who is less privileged also requires recognition of the fact that even a
non-lawyer judge may lose his outsider's perspective and become as insensitive,
52
cynical and critical of the court clientele as lawyers are accused of being. Finally,
it is possible that a non-lawyer judge might adopt an approximation of a legal
construct against which to measure the testimony of participants to a lawsuit,
and
thereby eliminating the alleged advantage of having an adjudicator able to hear
253
decision.
a
consider non-legal aspects of the parties' dispute in rendering
Thus, there are differing opinions as to whether lawyer or non-lawyer judges are
most likely to be sympathetic to the needs of the poor. However, because I do not
think that natural sympathies are as important as other qualities, I do not attempt to

See also PROVINE, supra note 61, at 145-47.
250. Professor Provine's study concluded that, at least in New York, non-lawyer judges were of a different
socio-economic class than lawyers. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at 145-47.
The one potentially relevant respect in which lawyer and nonlawyer justices do tend to diverge
significantly is in socioeconomic status. Class differences between the two groups may thus help
explain why lay justices interact more with litigants and would-be litigants: closer than lawyers
to the social status of the court's clientele, lay justices are more likely to travel in the same social

orbits. The socio-economic gulf between lay and lawyer justices is wide.

Id.

251. At least one study supports the notion that wealth or education does not necessarily translate into
insensitivity toward the poor. See Ryan & Guterman, supra note 138. That study attempted to discern the biases
of lawyer versus non-lawyer judges in regards to minorities, women and the poor. See id The study surveyed all
New York town, village and city court justices in communities with a population of between 10,000 and 50,000,
to which at least one judge in 67 of the 155 communities surveyed responded. See id at 274. In regard to women
and minorities, the study found few differences in the attitudes of lay and lawyer judges. See id at 277. But in
regard to the poor, the authors found that "a higher percentage of lawyer judges expressed positions sympathetic
to poor people." Id at 277-78.
252. For example, one of the non-lawyer judges discussed in Provine's book confessed that both lawyer and
non-lawyer justices "refer to the most confused and ignorant of this lot [i.e., the litigants] as 'packrats' or
'woodchucks,' which one justice defined as 'people who don't know to take their hats off in court."' PROVINE,
supra note 61, at 152.
253. Conley & O'Barr describe the small claims court success of litigants who frame their testimony in "law
talk" as opposed to those who use more normal, complete speech in presenting their small claims cases. See Conley
& O'Barr, supra note 65. They conclude that litigants who are able to frame their cases into a legal structure do
better in small claims court than those litigants who are unable to do so. See id This finding held true both in
Colorado's small claims courts, where judges were required to be attorneys, and in North Carolina's small claims
courts, where judges were not required to be, and many were not, attorneys. See ideat 477.
In her 1979 study, Professor Silberman observed that "many non-attorney judges ... viewed their role as that
of formal adjudicator within legal norms. Hypotheses that lay judges will strss community norms rather than legal
rules were not supported by the site visits, at least when the judge was called upon to 'decide' a case." Silberman,
supra note 115, at 532.
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address here the question of whether non-lawyer judges are naturally more
sympathetic to the needs of less privileged litigants in limited jurisdiction courts.
Rather, I emphasize that even if this natural preference for the "common man" is
accurate, the analysis cannot end there. The desire to protect the rights of less
privileged litigants and the ability to do so are two different things.
As discussed earlier, non-lawyer courts are not necessarily places where matters
are between members of the same class or group.2 54 Rather, they are forums where
members of a more privileged group often litigate against a less privileged group.
Thus, it is crucial for the members of the less privileged group that the judges in
these courts be able to afford them the protection to which they are entitled. This
is of particular concern when the member of the less privileged group does not have
counsel.
Many of the protections afforded to less privileged litigants are by operation of
statute. The Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act prescribes a particular way
in which an eviction can be carried out.1 5 If the statutorily prescribed process is not
specifically and carefully followed by the landlord, an eviction is improper. The
same statute dictates under what circumstances a security deposit can be kept256 and
how one can force a landlord to cure poor conditions.257 The U.C.C. dictates how
secured goods can be repossessed and resold."5 The Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act259 specifically dictates what debt collectors can and cannot do in an attempt to
collect debts. If the act is not followed, damages are awarded to the debtor.26
Various state statutes govern cancellation of home solicitation sales, 26' use of
negotiable instruments in consumer sales, 262 disclaimer of warranties in consumer
sales,263 and a host of other consumer transactions.
While these laws may signify a legal system so complex that those living under
it cannot necessarily comprehend it all, 2' which may not be desirable in the
abstract, these are the laws that prevent a landlord from throwing a tenant out in the
middle of the night, that keep a debt collector from calling a debtor's home at 3:00
in the morning, and that entitle the owner of a car to catch up on past due payments
before losing the car to the secured party.
The ability to find and apply these statutory rules is essential to the protection of
the less stationed litigant. No amount of natural sympathy for that litigant can
compensate for the lack of this information. 26' The judge's ability to locate, know,

254. See supra notes 228-233 and accompanying text.
255. See Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act §§ 4.201-4.207 (1972).
256. See id. § 2.201.
257. See id. §§ 4.103-4.105.
258. See U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to 9-507 (1972).
259. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994 & Supp. 111996).
260. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.
261. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 555A.1-555A.6 (1997).
262. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 537.3307.
263. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639 (1997).
264. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at 190 (arguing that "the elimination of nonlawyer judges suggests the
incapacity of laypersons to comprehend the rules they must live by."); see also Pankratz, supra note 82, at 1102-03
(suggesting that early Americans may have intended to avoid such a complex system).
265. In the criminal context Jerold Israel has observed that:
The movement away from lay magistrates stems from concern that the advantages provided by
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interpret, and apply these rules is of even greater importance in a limited jurisdiction court, where economic considerations mean that individual litigants may not
be represented by counsel.' Without any attorneys involved in the litigation, either
as advocate or judge, it is possible that legal considerations will never come to the
court's attention.67 As observed more than sixty years ago, "It is not enough that
we should have good substantive laws. We must have good courts which will
268
speedily, wisely, justly and economically administer them."
Because many of these statutory protections for the common person were
products of the 1970s, it is not surprising that analyses of the abilities of lawyer
judges to protect individual litigants undertaken before and during the 1970s do not
take this factor into account.269 But with the advent of consumer protection
27
legislation," ° the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act, ' and other similar
enactments, the legal abilities of the judge become one of the most important
aspects of protecting the individual litigant. I suspect that studies might demonstrate
that in cases in which there is some statutory protection for less privileged litigants,
non-lawyer judges do not use these statutory shields to protect less privileged
litigants. This comports with my own observations as a legal services attorney. For
example, on those occasions where I had to appear in regard to a landlord/tenant
matter, I remember sitting through other cases and watching tenants get "railroaded"
through the process, whether or not they had rights under the Arizona Residential
Landlord Tenant Act.272 Certainly, this might occur with a lawyer judge as well, but
it would be less likely to be caused by a failure to understand the relevant statutes
and case law.
Furthermore, other studies suggest that lawyer judges can serve the function of
translating lay accounts of incidents that are the subject of litigation into legal
structure, thereby assisting parties in transforming stories from non-legal discourse

their perspective are diluted by the bureaucratization of the magistrate's position within the
judicial hierarchy and are offset by the typical magistrate's lack of familiarity with, or lack of
inclination to take seriously, the defendant's basic legal rights.
Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstonesof the Judicial Process, 2-SPG KAN. J.L & PuB. POL'Y 5, 19 (1993). Unda
Silberman recognized that "[tihe growing complexity of constitutional and statutory law has aggravated the
problem caused by the absence of formal legal training among lay judges." Silberman, supra note 115, at 507.
266. Question 23 of Professor Provine's survey asked about the frequency with which any lawyer played a
part in small claims cases in the courts of those judges surveyed. See PROVINE, supranote 61, at 194. The study
found that in non-lawyer courts lawyers had a role in 9% of the small claims cases. See id. at 109, 227 n.66. In
lawyer courts, lawyers had a role in 21% of small claims cases. See id. Use of lawyers appears to be decreasing in
these types of cases. See Parker & Fields, supranote 204.
267. See Silberman, supra note 115, at 536-37.
268. Keebler, supra note 100, at 3.
269. See, e.g., Green et al., supra note 74, at 388 ("Conversely, a judge trained in the law... might be more
disposed toward enforcing the letter of the law; a role orientation that is certainly conducive to decisions in favor
of the business plaintiff.").
270. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1994 & Supp. H 1996); Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (1974).
271. See supra notes 255-257 and accompanying text.
272. ARIz.REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-301 to 33-1381 (1990 & Supp. 1997).
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into legal results.27 a This task is difficult for any magistrate, but can be most
difficult for the lay magistrate.274
It would indeed be ironic if we were to opt for a system where the judge is
perceived to be sympathetic to less privileged litigants rather than one where the
judge would have the actual ability to protect the rights of these litigants. Even if
non-lawyer judges are more sympathetic to these litigants, they are the very same
people who may not have the ability to locate, apply and interpret the laws intended
to protect these litigants.
3.

Advocating the Use of Lawyer Judges wherever Possible Signifies an
Attempt to Protect the Rights of the Poor and Less Privileged
The position that I have taken in the previous section-that lawyer judges are
better positioned than non-lawyer judges to protect the interests of less privileged
litigants-has been criticized as reflecting an elitist view of less privileged litigants
as parties capable of consuming, but not administering justice.275 Others have
criticized such a position as "largely symbolic, based on the notion that only
lawyers should be judges."276 I suggest, rather, that it reflects a pragmatic
recognition that in all judicial settings, including those involving less privileged
litigants, lawyers are better able to address legal issues than non-lawyers. To my
mind, this explains the continued use of lawyer judges and lawyer advocates in all
but limited jurisdiction courts. In other words, advocating the use of lawyer judges
in limited jurisdiction courts does not reflect a distrust of the skills of non-lawyer
judges from certain socio-economic groups, but of non-lawyer judges in general. 2"
This is not a knee-jerk reaction to non-lawyer judges, but rather the recognition that,
at least in the civil context, judges at all levels are likely to be faced with vexing,
complex legal matters, and in all other civil settings these matters would only be
trusted to lawyer judges.
The crowded dockets of courts all over the country, despite the availability of
non-public alternatives to judicial dispute resolution, such as arbitration and
mediation, support the notion that our society trusts the skills of lawyer judges over
non-lawyer judges. Furthermore, only public courts can force parties to participate
in a lawsuit, or risk liability, and only public courts provide an adjudicator paid for
out of the public coffers. No one in recent times has suggested that wealthy or

273. See O'Barr & Conley, supra note 209, at 690-94. The authors found that "the effect of the magistrate's

participation is often to provide the legal structure and explicit assessment of blame that is lacking in many
unquestioned lay accounts." Id. at 661.
274. See id. at 697. ("However, the small claims court magistrate must not only perform this evaluative
function but must also develop the hypothesis to be evaluated, all in the course of a brief hearing, aided only by
a one or two-sentence complaint. This may be asking too much, particularly when the magistrate lacks legal
training or expertise.").
275. See PROVIE. supra note 61, at 32. Professor Provine also takes the position that this is a
disenfranchisement of the poor. See id
276. Lamber& Luskin, supra note 115, at 299.
277. Others have even suggested that using non-lawyer judges in courts that serve the less privileged, far from
promoting the interests of the less privileged, serves to control them. See Conley & O'Barr, supra note 65,at 494
(citing 1 R. ABEL,THE PoImcs oF INRMAL JUSTICE 6 (1982X"A critical legal theorist might carry the argument
further and contend that these texts [of hearings before non-lawyer judges] provide evidence that judicial officials
use informal courts as an instrument of class control.")).
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privileged litigants should be forced to litigate before similarly situated non-lawyer
judges. Rather, the preference is for lawyer judges.
Thus, it is quite clear that appearance before lawyer judges is the preferred
choice for most litigants whose cases involve more money than the jurisdictional
limit of the justice courts." 8 How, then, can anyone conclude that given a choice
litigants who are not members of a "privileged" group, and most need protections
afforded by law, would opt for a non-lawyer judge?
My point is this: class considerations favor using lawyer judges rather than nonlawyer judges. We should be less concerned about representation by the less
privileged on the bench, and more concerned with the competence and quality of
justice dispensed at that level.279 This is particularly important in light of the fact
that the business of limited jurisdiction courts is subject to little scrutiny, and the
court retains jurisdiction over disputes involving individuals who are less politically
organized or powerful. As explained by Conley and O'Barr, "we are concerned that
this unchecked discretion is concentrated at the lowest levels of the judicial system,
and suspect that it would not long be tolerated at levels where parties have the
wherewithal to assert their own rights vigorously, or benefit from the efforts of
organized advocacy groups. 28 °
Finally, we must be mindful of why civil litigants choose to bring their cases to
court rather than seek out mediation or arbitration from non-legal sources. Litigants
bring disputes to court once they frame them as involving legal issues. Since the
litigants themselves have characterized the issues this way, the primary attribute of
28
the courts should be the ability to apply law in the resolution of these issues. ' If
we do not provide less privileged litigants with judges possessing this ability, we
run the risk of creating a system where access to a lawyer judge is reserved for
businesses and the upper classes.
The Effect of Not Matching JudicialRequirements to the Task of the
Job: What Happens when We Expect Non-Lawyer Judges to Act Like
Lawyer Judges
I doubt I will ever forget the insecurity of being a law student and then a new
lawyer, asked to function in a world where words have a different meaning than in
other contexts, and where analysis requires a precision with which I was unfamiliar.
I am reminded of this "pre-law" status each year as I call on contracts students in
the first months of their first year of law school. From these experiences, I can

D.

278. Professor Provine recognizes this: "To date, the middle class has been more involved in administering
dispute resolution centers than in using them to resolve their own disputes." PROVINE, supra note 61, at 53.
279. The concern for the quality ofjustice dispensed at the bottom of the court structure has been recognized
in other places. See, e.g., Baar,supra note 73, at 179 ("Minnesota, the one state to approximate the ABA standards
[regarding court unification] most fully, has also transformed the unified trial court concept from one rooted in
doctrines of efficiency to one reflecting an emerging concept of judicial equality-a concept that moves beyond
the equality of contending parties toward the equal importance of all types of court work.").
280. Conley & O'Barr, supra note 65, at 506.
281. See Mansfield, supra note 156 (addressing the role of "law" and legal content in the lives of litigants).
Regarding whether the main purpose of small claims litigants is to air their grievances and let off steam, see O'Barr
& Conley, supra note 209. The authors conclude that providing a court where litigants can tell their stories "may
be a mechanism by which informal procedures substitute expressive satisfaction for the enforcement of rights." Id.
at 699.
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imagine how hard it must be for a non-lawyer judge to address the complex
questions that can arise in a civil lawsuit with judicial authority, certainty and
accuracy. It strikes me that without the training and experience required of a lawyer
judge, the non-lawyer judge is left to find ways to appear knowledgeable when he
is not and to legitimize his exercise of judicial power.
One way for a non-lawyer judge to cope with his lack of knowledge and
education is to study the law on his own. As discussed before, this is now deemed
an inadequate method for learning the law.2" 2
Another way for a non-lawyer judge to appear knowledgeable is to rely on the
advice of lawyers when she adjudicates a case which, in her estimation, requires the
knowledge of a lawyer to be accurately decided. a3 There is evidence that some lay
judges consult lawyers when they feel the need. For example, Professor Provine
interviewed
one non-lawyer judge who "kept three lawyers and a local judge 'on
28 4
call."
Of the possible ways to cope with lack of a legal education, this is probably one
of the best. After all, the non-lawyer judge gets access to the expertise of a lawyer
whenever he feels the need. But this method of coping has limitations. First, one of
the main justifications for allowing non-lawyers to sit on the bench is the dearth of
available lawyers in less populated areas of the United States.28 5 Another
justification for allowing non-lawyers on the bench is that they diversify the bench,
economically and socially. 6 If both of these justifications are true, then not all nonlawyer judges will have access to lawyer advice, either because lawyers are not
geographically available or because the non-lawyers are not socially "grouped" with
lawyers, and thus they may not know any lawyers to whom to turn for advice.
Of course, one could argue that lawyer advice can be made easily available
through means other than face-to-face contact. After all, with the advent of the
internet, e-mail, and other technological advances, almost anyone in a remote area
can access expertise of almost any kind. However, this same argument can be made
in regard to access to lawyer judges. In other words, if lawyer advisors can be made
available through modem technology, why not just make those lawyers available
as judges through the same technology?
A more important concern for me is the public policy choice to give the nonlawyer authority over the courtroom, rather than the lawyer behind the scenes. It
seems to me it would be more appropriate to have whoever is responsible for
selecting judges (either by appointment or election) pass judgment on the judicial
capabilities of a lawyer judicial candidate, rather than pass judgment on the judicial
capabilities of a non-lawyer judicial candidate, who then has the discretion to
choose which lawyer to turn to for legal advice.

282. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
283. See Silberman, supra note 115, at 545-46 (suggesting maintenance of panels of attorneys to whom nonlawyer judges can turn with legal questions, or providing non-attorney judges with a legal staff to provide advice
on legal issues).
284. PROVINE, supra note 61, at 97.
285. See Silberman, supra note 115, at 507.
286. See PRoVINE, supra note 61, at 145-47, 168.

Winter 1999]

THE ROLE OF NON-LA WYER JUDGES

A third, and unfortunate, method for a non-lawyer judge to cope with his lack of
adequate legal training is to engage in the pretense of knowledge where there is
none, in an effort to appear knowledgeable in the law. This pretense might involve,
for example, the use of legal jargon which the judge does not really understand.2 7
Finally, a judge might compensate for inadequate ability by controlling the types of
arguments and issues that may be brought into court. This can be done by restricting
legal argument to the level at which the judge comprehends the law, 28 8 thereby
preventing the judge from losing legitimacy through inability to comprehend the
arguments being made, or by maintaining idiosyncratic rules or procedures to which
only the judge and insiders to that particular court are privy.28 9
These judicial attempts to cope without a legal education in a world where law
controls can result in a court system without some of the professed advantages of
a non-lawyer court, such as informality of process and rules. In fact, the resulting
system may be less litigant-friendly than a lawyer-officiated court system because
litigants may end up in a court with the same atmosphere for which lawyerofficiated courts are criticized: one in which only insiders have the ability to
manage their cases and try to predict outcome. Yet because of the judge's lack of
legal training, there is nothing, not even representation by an insider (i.e. a lawyer)
or access to other inside information (such as court handbooks, 2 ° statutes, and court
rules) that can compensate for the litigant's lack of information about the litigation
process and potential outcomes. Rather, the process291and outcomes are dictated
solely by the unmonitored judgment of the lay judge.
Given the different perspectives that legal training affords, it is not surprising
that non-lawyer judges reportedly do not like lawyers. 2 1 Such non-lawyer hostility
toward lawyers raises the disturbing concern that those who choose to use lawyers
in these courts will be discriminated against, thus leaving litigants in a "damned if
you do, damned if you don't" position. If the litigant represents himself, he is likely
to have difficulty obtaining the information necessary to do it right. If the litigant
uses a lawyer, she risks suffering consequences from the hostility felt toward her
lawyer.
In addition to observing judges who engaged in the pretense of superior
knowledge of the law, various authors have observed lay judges engaged in
practices which show their misconceptions regarding the proper roles of the various
287. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 10 through 12 and accompanying text.
290.

RALPH WARNER, EVERYBODY'S GUIDE TO SMALL CLAIMS COURT (1995).

291. This was bemoaned in 1927 as a lack of "certainty in the treatment of cases in courts ... on which
litigants should be able to rely with confidence." Smith, supra note 54 at 128. The author further noted that "[the
advantage of this certainty is given the man with a case involving large sums but is utterly denied the man with a
case involving a sum over which the justice of the peace has jurisdiction." Id.
292. Professor Provine points out that many lay judges do not like lawyers, partially because they are
"repelled by the willingness of lawyers to represent anyone, guilty or not, for a fee." PROVINE, supra note 61, at
161. She also states that "[t]hese justices, not surprisingly, relished opportunities to put lawyers in their place.
Nearly every one of them told and appreciated jokes about lawyers, and many recounted instances where they had
set one straight on a legal issue." Id. at 162. As more fully described in the opening of this article, in my own
practice I was occasionally the object of non-lawyer judicial disdain, as demonstrated by the judge's condescending
comment in her minute entry that I should have "actually read the judgment before submitting unnessary (sic)
pleadings." See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
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actors in a lawsuit (plaintiff, prosecutor, defendant and judge). For example, in one
study the authors used a question about pre-trial discussions with the prosecution
in criminal matters to discern, it appears, whether non-lawyer judges were more
likely than lawyer judges to rely on the prosecution.293 What they uncovered instead
was evidence that non-lawyer judges engage in prohibited ex parte communication
with the prosecution, apparently not realizing that pre-trial contact with the
prosecution alone is prohibited.294 The lawyer judges surveyed apparently
recognized that such contact was improper, as the only such contact reported in the
survey was by non-lawyer judges. This comports with my own experiences reported
at the beginning of this article.
These examples of judicial coping behaviors are disturbing indicators of an entire
court system for the common people that does not accept the most basic tenets on
which our justice system is founded, such as access to information, the right to
choose to use counsel, the right to an informed and unaffiliated adjudicator, and the
right to equal communication with and access to the court. Yet, we cannot be
surprised that non-lawyers must engage in such pretenses in states where the nonlawyer judiciary is expected to apply the same procedural and substantive rules as
those that govern lawyer officiated courts. How else can a non-lawyer judiciary
cope with the daunting problem of needing to appear knowledgeable in the law and
court procedure?
In states where limited jurisdiction courts function like smaller versions of
general jurisdiction courts, lawyers and legislators responsible for creating and
overseeing these courts must recognize that if skills and credentials do not match,
judges will be forced to engage in the types of coping behaviors described in this
article.
E.

The Efficacy of External Controls on the Conduct of Non-Lawyer Judges in
Civil Matters
In courts where the judges are lawyers, certain controls on the quality of
adjudication are naturally present. First, any judge sitting on a bench where a law
degree is required must have maintained the minimum grade point average
necessary to graduate from law school and must have passed the bar exam. This
ensures that the judge is at least minimally competent in the law. This assurance is
not present when the judge is not a lawyer, and minimal competency tests, which
necessarily must focus mostly on the criminal jurisdiction of the non-lawyer judge,
are not the same as successful progression through three years of law school and bar
passage.
Second, lawyer judges retain their membership in the bar. Therefore, ajudge who
is a lawyer is governed by the ethical rules that regulate all lawyers, in addition to
the rules that govern the conduct of judges. This has the added benefit of insuring
that the judge knows what is expected ethically of the lawyers that appear in the
court. When the judge is a lawyer, the judge is better equipped to recognize and

293. Ryan & Guterman, supra note 138, at 279.
294. See id.; accord Silberman, supra note 115, at 535.
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regulate unethical conduct by lawyers appearing before the judge.295 When the
judge is not a lawyer, and the suit involves a represented party against an individual,
unrepresented party, the lawyer's conduct with the unrepresented party can escape
judicial scrutiny. A non-lawyer judge, himself not governed by the ethical rules that
govern members of the bar, is less familiar, or may even be unfamiliar, with rules
that would come into play in such a setting. Thus, judicial oversight of such
conduct, which has been recommended as one of the effective means of controlling
misconduct in this type of setting, cannot be effective.29 6
That we as a profession value the oversight that comes naturally with membership in the bar is evidenced by the recent attention paid by bar associations to the
unauthorized practice of law. The organized bar's efforts to eliminate the
unauthorized practice of law flows in large part from the fear that there is no
adequate method of overseeing and controlling the quality of services provided by
non-lawyers giving legal advice (including such concerns as confidentiality, fiscal
responsibility, etc.).2 97 Mandatory compliance with the rules that govern an
attorney's conduct provide this oversight and control in regard to lawyers licensed
to practice in a state, whether they are on the bench or not. While some control and
oversight can be gained through judicial conduct rules governing non-lawyer
judges, there is still a level of control missing that exists with lawyer judges who
are members of the bar. Nevertheless, we seem to maintain the position that even
though a non-lawyer is incapable of practicing law, a non-lawyer is capable of
adjudicating legal cases. This use of non-lawyers as judges in limited jurisdiction
courts in a system ardently opposed to any form of law practice by non-lawyers
suggests that there is some ability to oversee and control non-lawyer judges that
does not exist in regard to non-lawyers giving legal advice to clients.298 Thus, we
convey the impression that an adequate means of official oversight exists when, in
fact, it does not.
Societal apathy toward the business of non-lawyer courts eliminates a third
control on the quality of adjudication in these courts. The courtrooms of lawyer
judges are likely to garner more public attention, and the scrutiny that necessarily
accompanies that attention, from the organized bar, the rest of the judiciary, and the
public than limited jurisdiction courts. 2' While this lack of scrutiny might allow
295. The issue of lawyer conduct in regard to unrepresented, poor opponents was addressed fully by Russell
Engler in a recent article. See Engler, supranote 216. While this article assumes that judges will be lawyers, it does
make the point that lawyer judges can exercise control over such conduct: "The legal proceedings likely occur
under the auspices ofjudges, whose behavior is regulated in their capacities both as judges and lawyers." Id. at 158.
296. See id. ("Courts must provide additional oversight to ensure that the rights of unrepresented litigants
are protected."). Indeed, lack of "supervision and control" was cited by the 1967 Task Force Report on the Courts
as a defect of justice of the peace courts. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 62.
297. See, e.g., Lynda C. Shely, Lawyers and UPL: What Should You Do, ARIZONA ATrORNEY, Feb. 1998,
at 31.
298. For example, Arizona permits non-lawyers to hear cases worth up to $5,000, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
22-201, and yet strictly prohibits nonlawyers from giving any legal advice at all. See Shely, supra note 297, at 31.
299. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at 151; (noting "the perception that these courts are insignificant... and
the resultant lack of scrutiny from "news reporters, court watchers, and the bar"); see also Harris, supra note 151,
at 415-16, 431 (maintaining that lower courts in de novo systems (including non-lawyer and lawyer judge courts)
have little accountability due to lack of appellate review and relative lack of influence of constituencies that appear
in these courts). At least one group of authors have argued that all courts escape public attention, and that "[t]his
low visibility tends to submerge the problems of the court system under a blanket of silence." Green et al., supra
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certain freedoms from restraint for limited jurisdiction judges, 3" it also means these
courts escape the primary means by which our society holds government accountable. There is the added concern that the non-lawyer court system is the one that is
the most relevant to the affairs of the average person, particularly people who are
poor, and yet is the part of the system which escapes oversight the most. Thus, there
is a lack of oversight of a system that governs people who are the most politically
powerless to change the system if they are dissatisfied with it, and which uses
adjudicators who are the least prepared for their professional role. In other words,
we allow non-lawyers, who ought to have the most oversight and scrutiny, to
adjudicate in the court level that garners the least attention.
Since the controls that normally exist with a lawyer judiciary are not present with
a non-lawyer judiciary, states that choose to use non-lawyers to adjudicate civil
matters must consider whether other, substitute controls are effective. The
remainder of this section discusses possible external controls for making the nonlawyer judiciary accountable, and whether such controls can work.
1. De novo Appeals
Perhaps in recognition of the need for some sort of oversight when a non-lawyer
presides in civil matters, many states that force litigation of certain civil matters in
non-lawyer courts provide for de novo appeal to lawyer courts.3"1 At first glance,
the right to a de novo appeal would seem to protect litigants who are forced to
appear before a non-lawyer judge the first time around. Indeed, the right to trial de
novo before a lawyer judge is what led the Supreme Court to hold that there is no
denial of due process when criminal litigants appear before a non-lawyer judge.'s 2
However, there are problems with the use of de novo appeals to compensate for
mandatory litigation before non-lawyers.
First, appeal rates generally show that parties do not tend to appeal decisions
rendered by non-lawyer judges. 3 Thus, even in states which grant de novo appeal

note 74, at 381.
300. See PROV9NE, supra note 61, at 151 ("The perception that these courts are insignificant, a view that is
widely shared outside law-enforcement circles, does carry with it one advantage, however. It frees town and village
justices from the scrutiny of news reporters, court watchers, and the bar, giving them room to respond creatively
to some of the limitations built into the system.").
301. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 9571(c) (Supp. 1998); LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 4924 (West
1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 33-10.1-5-9 (1997); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 77; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 35-13-2 (Repl.
Pamp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-19 (West 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-38-39 (Michie 1984); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-5-120 (Supp. 1998); see also PROVINE, supranote 61, at 27 (discussing the history of nonlawyer
courts in the United States); Silberman, supra note 115, at 539; NON-ATrORNEY JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 60-61.
A more cynical view is that trial de novo exists because of a total lack of trust in non-lawyer judges, with the
expected result of delaying litigants and causing them greater expense. See Smith, supra note 54, at 129.
302. See North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976). In that case the defendant had claimed that effective
assistance of counsel was denied since the lay judge could not fully comprehend his counsel's arguments. See id.
at 332, 334. The Court disagreed, stating that a right to trial de novo protected defendant's right to due process.
See id. at 339, see also Ryan & Gutterman, supra note 138.
303. One study showed that in 1976 the rate of appeal from decisions rendered by New York's town and
village courts was less than one percent. See JACK M. KRESS & SANDRA L STANLEY, JUSTICE COURTS IN NEW

YORK STATE: THE COURTS CLOSESr TO THE PEOPLE 107 (1976). Professor Provine recognizes that "[aippeals are
rar everywhere, and trial de novo, the traditional means of supervising justices of the peace, has apparently never
been attractive to litigants." PROVINE, supra note 61, at 132, 223 n.26. Professor Silberman acknowledges the same
low rate of appeals, and attributes this potentially to the requirement in many states that the litigant post a bond
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as of right, litigants may not take the opportunity for appeal afforded them by court
rules. With low appeal rates, the reality is that non-lawyer courts are "the court of
first and final resort."'
Second, considering the litigation pairings in these courts in civil cases,
recognizing the advantages that certain litigants have over the average individual
litigant, and recognizing the economic realities for many individuals in these courts,
it becomes essential for states to provide a system where the right answer is reached
on the first try. Many individual litigants cannot afford the costs of extended
litigation. It is simply not sufficient to force a tenant to wait until an appeal is
perfected and trial de novo obtained to tell that litigant-a litigant who may have
been rendered homeless by the non-lawyer judge's decision-that he was
wrongfully evicted.
States with low appeal rates should be asking why de novo appeal is not
attractive to litigants. Perhaps appeals are rare because litigants are satisfied with
the judgments rendered by non-lawyer judges. But it is equally possible that they
are rare because litigants have expended their litigation energy (financial,
emotional, mental, etc.) in the first court, because appeals are so cumbersome, or
even because litigants become disenchanted with the courts and feel that the second
time around could not be better than the first.'
In some states the right to trial de novo does not exist,' or is discretionary. 3" In
other states the right to a de novo appeal is somewhat illusory (for example where,
the litigant is charged with making sure an adequate record is kept for purposes of

in order to perfect an appeal. See Silberman, supra note 115, at 539, n.239; NON-ATORNEY JUSTICE, supra note
126, at 61. Other potential causes of low appeal rates identified by Silberman are the litigant's lack of knowledge
of the right to appeal, or the desire to have the matter over. See Silberman, supra note 115, at 539; NON-ATTORNEY
JusTICE, supra note 126, at 61-63. That appeal rates are indeed low was observed as long ago as 1927. See Smith,
supra note 54, at 125. A recent study of Montana's justice and city courts found that only 1.6% of civil cases were
appealed, "probably due to the minimal amounts at issue." Ford, supra note 75, at 203. Similarly, out of more than
fifty cases Conley and O'Barr observed during two weeks in one city court, only one was appealed. See Conley &
O'Barr, supra note 65, at 497 n.148.
In the criminal context it has been pointed out that one would expect a large appeal rate from lay and non-lay
limited jurisdiction court decisions since "defendants have nothing to lose and everything to gain by requesting
a new trial" and yet appeal rates are notoriously low. See Harris, supra note 151, at 397 & n.109. The author
attributes these low appeal rates to "the structure of de novo systems," which he argues "discourages defendants
from requesting new trials." Id. at 383, 401; accord Ludwig v. Mass., 427 U.S. 618, 632-38 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Whatever the reasons for low appeal rates from non-lawyer courts, it appears that the number of appeals that
do take place decrease tremendously when non-lawyers are barred from sitting as judges in limited-jurisdiction
courts. See Ashman & Chapin, supra note 135, at 421 (finding that appeals from limited-jurisdiction courts
dropped 50% to 60% in Colorado, and approximately 50% in Maryland after the two states required all judges to
be attorneys).
304. Ford, supra note 75, at 72.
305. Possible reasons for litigant failure to take de novo appeals from lay and lawyer judgments in criminal
cases in limited-jurisdiction courts are explored in depth in Harris, supra note 151. These reasons include monetary
cost (such as the cost of counsel for two trials, lost income from having to attend two trials, and expert fees for two
trials); non-monetary costs (such as activity opportunity costs-for example, showing up in court and preparing
for trial instead of doing anything else); and psychological costs. See id.
at 393, 401-405. Hais argued that in the
criminal area, the structuring of de novo appeals "discourages defendants from requesting new trials," and that "de
novo systems operate invisibly but forcefully to deter the exercise of the express right to a new trial." Id. at 383.
306. See, e.g., NEV. J. Crs. R. CIV. P. 72A(a).
307. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 77; COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-310 (West 1998); IDAHO CODE § I2213 (1998).
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the right to trial de novo, 3°s or where the litigant is forced to pay for the court
reporter in order to get an adequate record of the trial). 3 9 In each of these states,
proper functioning of the system is dependent on transcripts sufficient for adequate
appellate review. Despite this, in many of these states the "record" below consists
311
of tape recordings 310 or, worse yet, only of notes taken by judges or clerks.
The final, most basic problem with de novo appeals as a means of ensuring
legally correct decisions in limited jurisdiction courts with non-lawyer judges is that
it places the burden on litigants, most of whom are not represented, to recognize
when their case has been extralegally decided. 2 Certainly, wherever possible it is
better to have the rules of law applied by lawyer judges in civil matters than to force
litigants in these courts to recognize when an extra-legal decision has been made.
2. Training Programs
As discussed earlier in this article, several days, weeks, or months of training,
most of which by necessity must focus on the criminal cases non-lawyer judges will
handle, is not and never will be the same as three years of law school. The issues
that can arise in civil cases are too varied and too complex to be handled by judges
who have not had traditional legal training. This was the finding of the Silberman
study, which concluded that while training programs helped teach judges how to
protect basic rights, they were inadequate to give lay judges the analytic ability to
deal with legal issues.3 13
3. Automatic Right of Removal
The right of defendants to automatically remove their cases to the courts of
lawyer judges is an appealing idea because it protects litigants from being forced
to appear before a non-lawyer.
Professor Silberman's study concluded that: "In civil cases, lay-judge court
jurisdiction should be made concurrent with that of an attorney-judge court and a
defendant should have the right to transfer an action brought before a lay judge to
an attorney-judge.court. '3 "4 According to Professor Silberman, the primary benefit
of an automatic right of transfer is that the lay-court's civil jurisdiction becomes
consensual rather than mandatory. 5 She suggests that litigants will then be given
the option to consent to determination by a lay judge "when it appears that the

308. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
309. See Silberman, supra note 115, at 539.
310. See, e.g., ALASKA S. CT. Rule 2(l); AR. REv'. ST. ANN. § 22-261(c) (West Supp. 1998), ARIz. SUPER.
CT. R. APP. P.-Cvm 1l(eXl); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-309 (West 1998); IDAHO CODE § 1-2212 (1998).
311. Silberman, supra note 115. at 539; NON-ATrORNEY JusIcE supra note 126, at 59 (stating that lay
judges in New York often keep their own notes when there is no stenographer paid for by the court system).
312. See PROVINE supra note 61, at 184 ("Litigants at this level usually appear without counsel."). Indeed,
this problem can exist whether the right to appeal from a non-lawyer's decision is by de novo appeal or only
through traditional appellate review. Another related problem is the problem with ensuring that litigants are
informed of their right to de novo or traditional appeal. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 151.
313. See Silbermansupra note 115, at 538; NoN-ATrORNEY.JUSTIC, supra note 126, at 98-99,118,235-49.
314. Silberman, supra note 115, at 543-44.
315. See id at544.
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attorney court is too distant, slow, or expensive."3 6 Professor Silberman identifies
another benefit of making lay jurisdiction consensual through a right of removal or
transfer: if the defendant intends to re-litigate the case before a lawyer judge in any
event, the right of removal eliminates the costs of two trials and avoids a first
"sham" trial.3 17
Clearly a right of removal serves the purpose of making lay-judge jurisdiction
consensual. Providing such a right of removal might also serve to finally answer the
question that scholars and researchers have been unable to definitively answer-whether litigants prefer local, community-based justice or access to an
attorney judge. However, even a right of removal cannot tell us what is best for
litigants. As with the right to de novo appeal, the right of removal puts in the
untrained litigant's hands the decision regarding whether she would be better off
appearing before a non-lawyer judge. This assumes that the litigant has a host of
information that she is unlikely to have, such as whether her case implicates any
statutory defenses or counterclaims.
4. Simplified Rules
A final option for these courts would be to go back in time, as it were, and turn
them back into the informal community tribunals they once were. This would entail,
among other things, the return to extremely informal rules of procedure.3"' The cost
of doing this, of course, is that the protections and rules of law deemed necessary
to protect other litigants would not be available to individual litigants, even when
facing more experienced and powerful opponents. This too, seems an untenable and
undesirable option. Litigants at all levels of society should be entitled to the
protections deemed necessary in all other litigation settings.
F. Non-JudicialAlternatives to Non-Lawyer Limited JurisdictionCourts
It may not be feasible for all states to provide all limited jurisdiction courts with
lawyer judges. Indeed, one of the primary justifications for the continued existence
of non-lawyer courts is a dearth of lawyers in rural America.
One legislative means of compensating for the lack of lawyers in small towns has
been to set up a tiered judiciary, with increased judicial qualifications in areas with
a larger population base.3 9 Fans of this approach claim that it takes into account the
shortage of lawyers in rural areas, the historical preference for non-lawyers in rural
America, where populations are more homogeneous and familiar, and the varying
community standards and anonymity of life in urban America.3' This census-based
approach was one of the main legislative recommendations that grew out of the
1979 Silberman study.3 2 '

316. Id.
317. See id. at 543.
318. For an example, see the recent rules proposals made in Montana. See Ford, supra note 75, at 204.
319. This approach is currently taken by various states. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-203 (West
1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 602.6404 (West Supp. 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. § 4.010 (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 352-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-15-5005 (1994); WASH. REV. CoDE § 3.34.060 (1988).
320. See PROVINE, supra note 61, at 22.
321. See Model Non-Attorney Judge Improvements Act, 17 HARV. J. L.GIS. 547 (1980) (based on Silberman,
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I suggest, instead, a different alternative to using lawyer judges at all court levels
in all communities. Given the state of communications, and the number of lawyers
licensed to practice law in every state, states should consider providing every
litigant in a limited jurisdiction civil matter with an attorney adjudicator through the
use of lawyer judges or judges pro tem, where possible, and the use of appointed
lawyers serving as arbitrators where lawyer judges are not possible. The State of
Arizona currently uses this approach by mandating that all cases filed in superior
court where the amount in controversy is less than $50,000 are subject to binding
arbitration conducted by a lawyer. 322 Lawyers are generally assigned a case or two
a year which they are to arbitrate. The arbitration decisions are binding as final
judgments.32 3
Whether this approach could work for limited jurisdiction civil cases must be
addressed at the state level. One way to do this would be to compare the number of
active members of the bar with the civil filings currently routed to non-lawyer
judges. For example, in Arizona the active membership in the Arizona bar was at
around 10,000 members in 1998.32 There were 135,662 civil cases filed in justice
courts in the state of Arizona in 1995.325 Thus, it would be possible for every
limited-jurisdiction civil case to be adjudicated by a lawyer so long as each lawyer
in Arizona agreed to handle 13 cases per year. Of course, this number could be
made lower by the use of lawyer judges in highly populated areas, or by only
requiring the use of a lawyer-arbitrator in cases where an answer is filed or where
no settlement is reached. This would significantly reduce the number of cases for
which each lawyer-arbitrator would be responsible during a given year. These
alternatives should be considered in all states where the ratio of lawyers to limited
jurisdiction civil cases is similarly low.
Given the technology available, the plan to use lawyer adjudicators should work
even where the adjudicator is not physically located where the parties are. The state
need only supply litigants with modem methods of visual, audio and documentary
communication to facilitate the contact that would likely be needed to arbitrate a
civil dispute.
By having an arbitration system that appoints individual attorneys as adjudicators
in smaller civil matters, all litigants would enjoy the advantages of educated
adjudication, while at the same time the system would not be dependent on finding
a large number
of lawyers willing to serve as full-time judges adjudicating smaller
32 6
matters.

supra note 115); see also NON-ATTORNEY JUSTICE, supra note 126.
322. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-133 (Supp. 1997). The statute permits the superior court of each county to
set a level, not greater than $50,000, below which the case is referred to binding arbitration. In Maricopa County,
only those who are members of the bar are eligible to serve as arbitrators. See 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. SUPER. CT.
LOCAL PRAC. RULES, MARICOPA COUNTY, Rule 3.10(d) (1997).

323. See ARIz. REv. STAT. § 12-133(E) ("The award shall be entered by the court in its record ofjudgments,
and shall have the effect of a judgment upon the parties unless reversed upon appeal.").
324. There were 10,372 lawyers admitted and practicing in the State of Arizona as of June 2, 1998.
Telephone interview with the State Bar of Arizona, June 23, 1998.
325.

See STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 148 (1995).

326. Professor Provine suggests thai it is hard to find lawyers willing to serve as judges in limited jurisdiction
courts. She spends a part of her book on the abysmal and locally controlled financing of limited jurisdiction courts.
This leads to holding court in inappropriate buildings and to no clerical help for judges. See PROVINE, supra note

Winter 1999]

THE ROLE OF NON-LAWYER JUDGES

IV. CONCLUSION
I cannot claim from my experiences in Arizona to know what is best for every
state or community in the United States, nor would it be possible for me to gather
all of the information necessary to make reformative suggestions for every court
system that uses non-lawyer judges.3 However, I do suggest that the bar, bench and
legislatures of each state should re-visit with a critical eye their decisions to
perpetuate, whether intentionally or through neglect, the non-lawyer adjudicatory
system for civil matters at the lowest end of the court spectrum. This renewed call
for examination is particularly appropriate given the recent attention paid to access
32
to justice issues by the American Bar Association and other organizations.
Each state must start out by assessing the true reasons for the maintenance of
civil jurisdiction in non-lawyer courts, and then examine whether the existing courts
serve those purposes. If the true reason for the continued power of these courts over
civil matters is to provide alternative communitarian-based forums for dispute
resolution, then the rules must be crafted so as not to require legal knowledge in
their application, so as to insure the application of homogeneous community
standards, and so as to prevent the courts from being a tool for use by the haves,
who use the courts with some frequency, against the have nots. If the true reason for
the continued power of these courts over civil matters is simply to provide a swift,
inexpensive method for resolving disputes without taking up court and judicial
resources, then I believe states should be looking at models such as the mandatory
arbitration model used in the Arizona superior courts. If the true reason for the
continued power of these courts over civil matters is, as I suspect, unarticulated, and
perhaps even unformed, then notions of fairness and equal access to justice demand
that these courts be subject to closer inspection and exposure.
Any comprehensive analysis of whether a state should maintain the civil
jurisdiction of its non-lawyer courts must include empirical information and actual
observation of the courts and study of the clientele that use the courts. The
empirical data gathered must not lead to knee-jerk conclusions, such as the
assumption that large numbers of filings or few appeals signify a citizenry satisfied
with the operation of the courts. Rather, studies must seek to discover why there so
many filings; why there are few appeals. The analysis must also address basic
assumptions upon which the jurisdictions of non-lawyer courts have been based for
the last two centuries, such as whether litigants really prefer having a non-lawyer
judge available down the street, or in their town, over access to a lawyer-officiated
court a little further away. This analysis must look at whether modern communica61, at 124-27. Although she never says directly that this deters lawyers from seeking to become limited jurisdiction
judges, it is implicit from her description of the conditions under which some justices labor. Of course, many
attorneys in public service, such as public defenders and legal services lawyers, work in similar conditions.
327. As Neil Vidmar recognized in his assessment of the study he had performed, "the kinds of cases brought
to the Middlesex County Small Claims Court may differ from those brought to small claims courts in Portland,
Maine, or Chicago, Illinois, or some other jurisdiction." Vidmar, supra note 200, at 547.
328. See, e.g., J. Michael McWilliams, Justice for All-Allfor Justice, Making the System Workfor Everyone,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 6 (announcing the theme for the up-coming A.B.A. year as "Justice for All-All for
Justice"). The subject of the 1993 Litigation Section's Fail Meeting was "Justice in America." See Nancy Scott
Degan, Section Examines Justice in America at Annual Fall Meeting in DC, 18 LIIGATION, Aug. 1993 at 1.
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tion could serve both interests, making lawyer judges available through some form
of instant long-distance communication, such as fiber optic cable systems or video
linkups. Finally, the financial assumptions about the economic efficiency of using
non-lawyer judges must be carefully analyzed. It may not be cheaper for litigants
to litigate civil matters in limited jurisdiction courts, particularly in light of the need
to file an appeal before a review is made by an attorney judge. Most importantly,
states must find out what non-lawyer judges are really doing in civil cases in their
courts. The best place to start this inquiry is with the lawyers who, like myself,
practice in these courts. This must be followed by observation of these courts by
lawyers at a case-specific level.
The worst thing that states and bar associations can do is to allow the continuation of civil jurisdiction of non-lawyer courts without proper examination, while at
the same time extolling the virtues of access to justice at all economic levels. If
limited jurisdiction courts are expected to operate in civil matters as smaller
versions of the rest of the court system, and to adjudicate matters involving
technical statutory law and common law, then we must insist that the judges given
this task have the necessary training to perform the task. The best indicator of this
ability, and the best training for this task, is a law degree.
It is my sincere hope that the states that still have non-lawyer judges will take the
time and effort to engage in appropriate study and reform of these courts.
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APPENDIX 1
1997 Limited Jurisdiction New Judge Orientation
January 6 - 11, 1997
AGENDA
Monday, January 6 1997
ALL DAY JOINT SESSION WITH GENERAL JURISDICTION JUDGES
8:00 - 8:30

Registration

8:30 - 8:45

Welcome and Introductions

8:45 - 9:30

What's Different Now That You're a Judge?
Honorable Thomas A. Zlaket
Former Chief Justice Frank X. Gordon

9:30 - 9:45

Break

Honorable Thomas A. Zlaket
Honorable Stephen A. Gerst
Dean, Judicial College of Arizona
Honorable Stuart J. Shoob
Chair, Limited Jurisdiction Judges
Honorable David R. Cole
Chair, General Jurisdiction Judges
Karen Thorson, Division Director
Education Services, AOC

9:45 - 10:00

Judicial Ethics
Keith Stott, Executive Director
Commission on Judicial Conduct

10:00 - 12:00

Judicial Ethics and Demeanor
Honorable Robert W. Kuebler, Jr.
Honorable Allen G. Winker

12:00 - 1:30

Group Lunch

1:30 - 2:30

Matrix Personality Inventory
Jane Ball, Director of Training
National Curriculum and Training Institute
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Monday. January 6,1997 (Continued)
2:30 - 2:45

Break

2:45 - 3:45

Matrix Personality Inventory (Continued)

3:45 - 4:00

Break

4:00 - 5:00

Matrix Personality Inventory (Continued)

5:00 - 6:30

Reception for New Judges at Mesa Hilton Pavilion in Mesa

Tuesday. January 7,1997
8:30 - 9:30

Evidence
Honorable Joseph D. Howe

9:30 - 9:45

Break

9:45 - 10:45

Evidence/Problem Solving (Continued)

10:45 - 11:00

Break

11:00 - 12:00

Evidence/Problem Solving (Continued)

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch on your own

1:00 - 2:00

Civil & Criminal Traffic
Honorable Jerry Adams

2:00 - 2:15

Break

2:15 - 3:15

Civil & Criminal Traffic (Continued)

3:15 - 3:30

Break

3:30 - 5:00

Common Traffic Violations/Traffic Hearing/Role Play

5:30 - 7:30

Judicial College Dinner

THE ROLE OF NON-LAWYER JUDGES

Winter 1999]

Wednesday, January 8,1997
8:30 -9:30

Arrest/Non-Vehicle Search & Seizure
Warrants/Confessions/Motons/Pretrial Identification
Honorable Louis F. Dominguez
Honorable Karyn Klausner

9:30 - 9:45

Break

9:45 - 10:45

Vehicle Search - Seizure/Warrants/Problem Solving
Honorable Louis F. Dominguez
Honorable Karyn Klausner

10:45 - 11:00 Break
11:00 - 11:45

Vehicle Search & Seizure/Warrants/Problem Solving
(Continued)

11:45 - 12:00

Mentor Discussion

12:00 - 1:30

Lunch on your own

1:30 - 2:30

Guilty Pleas
Honorable Joseph L. Olcavage

2:30 - 2:45

Break

2:45 - 3:45

Guilty Pleas Demonstration and Role Play

3:45 - 4:00

Break

4:00 - 5:00

Initial Appearances
Honorable Joseph L. Olcavage
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Thursday, January 9,1997
8:30 - 10:15

Summary of DUI Law & Motions
Honorable Elizabeth R. Finn
Honorable R. Michael Traynor
Honorable Karyn K]ausner
Kent Kearney, Esq., Asst. Prosecutor, City of Phoenix
Sgt. Jeff Trapp, Department of Public Safety
Sgt. Toby Dyas, Tempe Police Department

10:15 - 10:30

Break

10:30 - 11:30

Summary of DUI Law and Motions (Continued)

11:30 - 12:00

Mentor Discussion

12:00 - 1:30

Lunch on your own

1:30 - 1:45

Summoning of Jurors
Honorable R. Michael Traynor

1:45 - 2:45

Voir Dire/Challenges
Honorable Elizabeth R. Finn
Honorable R. Michael Traynor

2:45 - 3:00

Break

3:00 - 3:45

Mock Trial: Shoplifting

3:45 - 4:00

Break

4:00 - 4:30

Jury Instructions

-

Forms of Verdict

Honorable Elizabeth R. Finn
Honorable R. Michael Traynor
4:30 - 5:00

Discussion

5:00 - 5:30

Mentor Discussion
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Friday. January 10 1997
8:30 - 9:30

Restitution/Victim's Rights
Honorable MaryAnne Majestic
Honorable Roxanne Song Ong

9:30 - 9:45

Break

9:45 - 10:45 Appeals/Sentencing

Honorable MaryAnne Majestic
Honorable Roxanne Song Ong
10:45 - 11:00 Break
11:00 - 12:00 Sentencing/Role Play

Honorable MaryAnne Majestic
Honorable Roxanne Song Ong
12:00 - 1:30

Lunch

1:30 - 2:30

Domestic Violence/Orders of Protection/Harassment
Honorable Elizabeth R. Finn

2:30 - 2:45

Break

2:45 - 3:45

Domestic Violence/Orders of Protection/Harassment
(Continued)

3:45 - 4:00

Break

4:00 - 5:00

Priors/Documentation
Honorable Michael K. Carroll

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Saturday. January 11. 1997
8:00 - 9:30

Landlord/Tenant & Problem Solving
Honorable Robert Melton
Honorable Clayton R. Hamblen

9:30- 9:45

Break

9:45-10:00

Weddings
Honorable James J. Sedillo

10:00- 11:15

Preliminary Hearings
Honorable Judy Ferguson
Honorable Stuart Shoob
Honorable James Sedillo

11:15 - 12:00 Lawyer Control
Honorable James E. Carter
Honorable Stuart J. Shoob

I:Vimitedinjo/97-njoagenda.jan Irev. 07/02/9ytrr-

[Vol. 29

THE ROLE OF NON-LAWYER JUDGES

Winter 1999]

1997 LIMITED JURISDICTION
NEW JUDGE ORIENTATION - (Follow-up)
March 10-14, 1997
AGENDA
Monday, March 10. 1997
8:30- 9:30

Pre-trial Motions
Honorable James E. Carter, Maricopa County Superior Court
Honorable John Kennedy, Mayer Justice Court

9:30 - 9:45

Break

9:45 - 10:45

Pre-trial Motions (continued)

10:45 - 11:00 Break
1:00 - 12:00
12:00- 1:30

Pre-trial Motions (continued)
Lunch

1:30- 2:30

Contracts
Honorable Toby Maureen Gerst, Maricopa County Superior
Court

2:30 - 2:45

Break

2:45 - 3:45

Contracts (continued)

3:45 - 4:00

Break

4:00 - 5:00

Contracts (continued)
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Tuesday, March 11. 1997
8:30 - 9:30

Managing Trials Effectively (full day program)
Honorable Robert W. Kuebler, Jr., Prescott Justice Court

9:30 - 9:45

Break

9:45 - 10:45

Managing Trials Effectively (continued)

10:45 - 11:00

Break

11:00 - 12:00

Managing Trials Effectively (continued)

12:00- 1:30

Lunch

1:30 - 2:30

Managing Trials Effectively (continued)

2:30 - 2:45

Break

2:45 - 3:45

Managing Trials Effectively (continued)

3:45 - 4:00

Break

4:00 - 5:00

Managing Trials Effectively (continued)

Wednesday. March 12. 1997
8:30 - 5:00

Courtroom Observations (full day program)
Scottsdale Justice Court
(new judges will choose which court they will observe
according to their jurisdiction)
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Thursday. March 13.1997
8:30 - 9:30

Operational Review
Agnes Felton, Court Services, Arizona Supreme Court

9:30 - 9:45

Break

9:45 - 10:45 Administrative Issues
Honorable R. Michael Traynor, Chandler Municipal Court
Joan Harphant, Court Administrator, Chandler Municipal
Court
10:45 - 11:00

Break

11:00 - 12:00

Administrative Issues (continued)

12:00- 1:30

Lunch

1:30 - 2:30

Administrative Issues (continued)

2:30 - 2:45

Break

2:45 - 3:45

Human Resource Issues
Carol Porter, Human Resource Officer - Arizona Supreme
Court

3:45 - 4:00

Break

4:00 - 5:00

Human Resource Issues (continued)

5:00 - 6:30

Reception

Friday, March 14, 1997
8:30 - 9:30

Contempt
Honorable Edward C. Voss, EI - Arizona Court of Appeals

9:30 - 9:45

Break

9:45 - 12:00

Roundtable Discussion

I:\-Atinited. njo\9 7njonwrNagenda.n-ar - 3/03/9 7
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